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THESIS

MASTER CHIEF PETTY OFFICER OF THE COMMAND
PROGRAM:
AN ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS SECOND LOOK

by

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June 1984

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The study focuses upon the effects of the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command Program as it is presently implemented in the Surface Forces of the U. S. Atlantic Fleet (NAVSURFLANT).

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Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command Program:
An Organizational Effectiveness Second Look

by

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Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy
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I. INTRODUCTION

Following World War II, American industry moved into an era of interest in organizational development, human resource management, and executive development. The Armed Services were often cited as excellent examples of organization and structure. Table I lists characteristics of an effective organization which junior officers are encouraged to inculcate into their management techniques [Ref. 1] and were often cited as responsible for the effective and efficient organization system of the Armed Forces [Ref. 2].

In years gone by, these characteristics of organization were set in stone in the U.S. Navy. The Captain of a ship carried out the missions assigned by delegating responsibilities and authority to his Executive Officer and department heads. Seamen requested considerations and provided information to the command by working through the petty officers. Chief Petty Officers received orders from, made reports to, and shared responsibilities with division officers.

In 1970, Admiral Elmo Zumwalt initiated a Chief Petty Officer Advisory Board via his naval message "Z-Gram" number 23. The purpose of the board was to provide recommendations and act as a sounding board on ideas and policy proposals of interest to the enlisted Navyman. In July 1971, acting on the recommendations of the Chief Petty Officer Board, Admiral Zumwalt initiated the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command (MCPOC) program in an effort to "stimulate a meaningful dialogue among all levels of command and to enhance command sensitivity to the needs of all enlisted

TABLE I

Excerpt from Division Officer's Guide

Principles of Organization

1. Every job given your division, every duty for which your division is responsible, must be assigned to one or more of your men.
2. All the responsibilities assigned to your men must be clear cut and well understood by them.
3. No specific responsibility should be assigned to more than one person.
4. Each member of the organization, from top to bottom, should know to whom he reports and who reports to him.
5. Responsibility must be matched by authority and accountability.
6. Do not have too many men report to one leader.
7. Exercise control on your proper level.
8. Divide the work load fairly among your subordinates.

[Ref. 1]

personnel." He further stated his desire to "ensure open and active lines of communications between (enlisted personnel) and (himself)." (Zumwalt, 1971)

One must assume that Admiral Zumwalt perceived a communications gap between himself and the enlisted community. Balancing this assumption against the background of the early 1970's and incidents aboard the Kitty Hawk and Constellation, one would feel quite safe in saying that there most probably was a significant communications gap between the CNO, Commanders, and Commanding Officers and the young enlisted personnel of the time. To close the gap, a

new formal structure was initiated. Clearly Admiral Zumwalt and his successors have restructured the chain of command for the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command, but have they not also restructured that chain of command for all hands? The function and position of the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command has been further defined and broadened by subsequent action and instruction. According to the most recent instruction, his responsibilities now include a broad spectrum of command-wide issues and interests.

(Excerpts of the OPNAVINST are provided in Appendix A.)

With the rebirth of "Pride and Professionalism" and the general shift of the United States military to many of the older, more authoritarian or classical traditions, there has been a swing away from many of the initiatives of Admiral Zumwalt. Why, then, has the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command program not been shelved along with the "Upward Seminars" and suit-style uniforms? Indeed, why is the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command enjoying ever-increasing recognition and sponsorship among senior officers? The purpose of this study is to provide Flag-level officers with a previously unarticulated package of possible problems regarding this very popular program.

As part of this study, the author conducted a survey (copy provided in Appendix C) of 824 personnel assigned to twenty commands within the surface forces of the U. S. Atlantic Fleet (NAVSURFLANT). Personnel represented a cross section of afloat commands from the service, amphibious, and cruiser-destroyer communities within NAVSURFLANT. The author also conducted approximately 35 individual unstructured interviews with senior officers, Commanding Officers of ships, Command Master Chief Petty Officers, and junior officers. Appendix D provides a list of all commands participating in either the survey or interviews. The information provided by the survey proved to be difficult to

interpret and regression analysis showed no significant correlations between rank (or billet) and choice of answers. The data is presented in Appendix E with answers to Questions 6 through 41 crosstabulated by billet. While the data is not conclusive or statistically significant, the author does refer to patterns of possible interest in the discussions on organizational perspectives which follow. The interviews proved to be very valuable in obtaining viewpoints of the program. The dialogue summaries provided in Appendix B are representative of the comments obtained overall. The majority of the senior officers interviewed expressed an overall positive opinion of the program. A few expressed very strong approval and recommended expansion of the program while, on the other extreme, a few expressed the opinion that the program was a wasteful use of expensive talent and should be cancelled. The great majority of the commanding officers felt that they should be allowed to pick their own Command Chief and that it should be a collateral duty except on very large ships. Again, the author does not explicitly incorporate the interviews into the paper, however the information and viewpoints were of great value and strongly affected the direction of the paper.

The paper is organized into four main chapters, each of which attempts to diagnose the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command program from an organizational effectiveness viewpoint using four different perspectives or aspects. These perspectives are: structural, (emphasizing who reports to whom, responsibility, authority, etc.) political, (emphasizing power and coalition) symbolic, (emphasizing the symbols associated with the program) and human resource (emphasizing the impact of the program on the individuals who make up the Navy). The final chapter is a summary of the author's conclusions and recommendations.

Table II lists the abbreviations which will be used in tables and figures.

TABLE II
List of Abbreviations

CC	Commanding Officer
CFO	Chief Petty Officer
Dept/DH	Department Head
Div Cff	Division Officer
Eng	Engineering Department Head
JC	Junior Officer
MCFOC	Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command the Command (also includes E-7 and E-8 personnel serving in this capacity)
Ops	Operations Department Head
S.E.A.	Senior Enlisted Advisor (forerunner of the MCFOC program)
Sup	Supply Department Head
Weaps	Weapons Department Head
XC	Executive Officer

II. STRUCTURAL PERSPECTIVE

Navy Regulations, Article 0701:

The responsibility of the Commanding Officer for his command is absolute, ...While he may, at his discretion, and when not contrary to law or regulations, delegate authority to his subordinates for the execution of details, such delegations of authority shall in no way relieve the Commanding Officer of his continued responsibility for the safety, well-being, and efficiency of his entire command.

A. DELEGATION

The above quotation, taken from Navy Regulations, describes in a few words the unique situation faced by a Commanding Officer of a naval ship. He is personally held responsible and accountable for the well-being and performance of his crew. While the Commanding Officer is responsible, he must, in practice, delegate tasks to his subordinates. Delegation may be defined as the assignment of authority and responsibility to another person for the carrying out of activities. The delegation of authority by Commanding Officers is obviously necessary for the efficient functioning of the ship since no Commanding Officer can completely supervise or accomplish every task. The degree to which any Commanding Officer will delegate is influenced by many factors, such as the specific task involved, his personal management style, and the inter-relationships, personalities, and capabilities of the personnel. These are "contingency" factors which each Commanding Officer will take into account in deciding how much to delegate. There

are also some generally accepted guidelines for effective delegation. Responsibility for a task should be assigned to the lowest level of the organization at which there can be found sufficient ability and information to carry out that task. For example, it would obviously be a waste of the Commanding Officer's time for him to remain in radio central screening all message traffic in order to read messages of interest to him. He has delegated this responsibility to radiomen via the chain of command. Should an important message be lost, the Commanding Officer will hold the communications officer accountable.

A corollary to this rule is that for individuals to perform their assigned tasks, they must be delegated sufficient authority. The communications officer in the example above must be able to determine training requirements, qualification requirements, and numerous other factors which will enable his division to effectively operate the communications guard. By accepting responsibility and authority, the communications officer has also agreed to accept credit or blame for the performance of his division. As a manager, the communications officer accepts accountability, not only for his performance, but for that of his subordinates.

The scalar principle of the classical "top to bottom" view of authority suggests that for delegation to work effectively, members of an organization must know where they stand in the chain of command. This clear definition of the lines of authority enable personnel to understand to whom they may delegate, who may delegate to them, and to whom they are accountable. This "cleanness" of delegation tends to prevent the existence of gaps, splits, and overlaps. Gaps occur when a task is not assigned. The unassigned task will either remain unperformed or will be performed by a person who views the task as an "extra" burden. Splits

occur when one task is divided and assigned to two organizational units. Overlaps occur when the same task (as a whole) is assigned to more than one person. With splits and overlaps, confusion of authority and accountability becomes probable.

There are two significant barriers to delegation:

1) reluctance to delegate and 2) reluctance to accept delegation. There are many reasons why managers prefer not to delegate in any given situation: "I can do it better myself"; "The younger managers aren't as level-headed as they should be"; "If they don't handle it right, the whole organization could suffer." The major factor preventing delegation is insecurity. Managers are accountable for the performance of their subordinates. Additional factors preventing delegation include lack of managerial ability to effectively delegate and lack of confidence in subordinates. The reasons that subordinates are reluctant to accept delegation parallel those of the manager. The subordinate may be insecure and prefer that the boss make all the decisions. The fear of criticism or personal fear of failure may also encourage the subordinate to avoid acceptance of delegated responsibility. The degree to which an organization delegates effectively characterizes that organization as centralized or decentralized. Ernest Dale (1967) described recentralization as a temporary curtailment of the power of subordinate levels of management brought about by recession or difficulties. During periods of recentralization, managers will more closely scrutinize subordinates to prevent mistakes which will tend to be more costly because of the environmental situation.

During the early 1970's there were numerous indications (USS Kitty Hawk, USS Constellation, and increased shipboard sabotage) that the traditional chain of command had failed to effectively manage the personnel problems of the day. In

an effort to resolve these problems and reduce the likelihood of future failures to communicate, Admiral Zumwalt initiated the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command program. Figures 2.3 and 2.4 demonstrate the typical shipboard formal structure before and after the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command program. In the shipboard structure before the implementation of the program, personnel matters were delegated to the various levels of the chain of command.




Figure 2.1 STRUCTURAL DELEGATION: PRE-MCPOC.

The Navy allows the Commanding Officer to hold his chain of command accountable for personnel matters. The Commanding Officer grants his chain of command the authority and

responsibility of appropriately deciding which personnel matters warrant his attention and which can be resolved at a lower level.




Figure 2.2 RECENTRALIZED STRUCTURE:POST-MCPOC.

With the introduction of the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command, the Navy has directed the Commanding Officer not to rely solely upon the chain of command to properly filter the personnel information. The Commanding Officer will now receive information filtered only by the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command. The Commanding Officer and Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command are now the officials deciding at what level the matter should be resolved. Indeed, the recentralization occurs above the ship/unit level. The Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command is responsible to keep not only the Commanding Officer but also the squadron or group Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command advised of matters of significance to the enlisted community.

B. DIVISION VS. FUNCTIONAL STRUCTURE

Closely related to the question of delegation is the issue of design of organizational structure. Modern organizations are organized into two basic designs of structure, functional or divisional. There is a third design which has become very common but is really a combination of the two. The matrix structure attempts to combine the benefits of divisional and functional designs. A divisional design groups together into a given subunit, all of the activities, skills, expertise, and assets required to produce and/or market some organizational product. With this unity of assets, it is much easier and faster to coordinate all necessary activities. Accountability for organizational goals is clear. A functionally designed organization groups together into a given subunit, all of the assets of a certain type to be redistributed to various organization activities for use. With the functional design the organization can improve supervision, since managers will have to be expert in only a narrow range of skills. It will be easier to activate certain specialized skills and bring these to bear on possible trouble spots. The major disadvantages of functional design is that coordination between different functional areas must take place at a much higher (and often remote) echelon of management. Figures 2.3 and 2.4 depict the design impact of the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command program.

The basic design for shipboard organization is essentially a functional structure. If the Weapons Officer can not maintain the guns in an operating condition, he will be held accountable. If he can not account for the funds used by his department, he will be held accountable. If he can not motivate his personnel to apply their efforts to the ship's goals, he will be held accountable.




Figure 2.3 DIVISIONAL STRUCTURE: PRE-MCPOC.

In the post-Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command design, the shipboard organization is essentially unchanged with one exception. There is now a functional line authority for enlisted personnel matters. While the division leaders (department heads) had previously exercised sole authority over enlisted personnel within their department, now an authority completely separate from their own has functional authority for enlisted matters.

C. SPAN OF SUPERVISION

Span of supervision refers to the number of subordinates who report directly to a manager or supervisor. Henri Fayol




Figure 2.4 FUNCTIONAL STRUCTURE: POST-MCPOC.

noted the need for different spans at different levels within the organization. Each foreman, for example, who is dealing with fairly simple tasks, may supervise twenty or thirty workers, while each superintendent may only supervise three or four foremen. [Ref. 3] In selecting the correct span, managers must consider not only the direct relationships with the supervised people but also the numerous combinations of relationships among all of those supervised. The choice of the appropriate span of supervision is important because it affects the efficient utilization of both the manager and his subordinates and because it affects the design of the structure. Too wide a span will encourage overextending managers, underutilizing subordinates, and

preventing sufficient communications and interpersonal time between the manager and at least some of his subordinates. Too narrow a span of supervision will underutilize the manager, overextend the subordinate, and encourage excessive manager-subordinate interaction. Again referring to Figure 2.3, pre-Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command structure gave the Commanding Officer a "primary" span of supervision over the Executive Officer and department heads. With the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command, the span of supervision has increased, admittedly by only one, but a very important one in terms of time and effort allocated to interpersonal relationships and communications. The Commanding Officer must now spend many hours discussing the individual problems or concerns of his entire enlisted complement. The Commanding Officer will listen to matters which ought to be (and maybe have been) solved at lower levels of supervision. This implies that he will spend a great deal of time with the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command; possibly to the detriment of his other immediate or close subordinates.

D. DUAL MANAGEMENT

Leaders face two separate functional demands which have been labelled as "task specialization/social specialization," (Bales, 1958); "concern for people/concern for production," (Blake and Mouton, 1964); "task orientation/relationship orientation," (Fiedler, 1967); and "task behavior/relationship behavior," (Hersey and Blanchard, 1972). Amitai Etzioni (1959) advocated the use of dual management in complex organizations. According to dual-management theories, individuals with strong task oriented styles of leadership tend to do well in task oriented situations. This manager will apply whatever

assets are necessary to successfully complete a given job. Because of his strong desire to get the job done, the task oriented leader will not give appropriate consideration to the needs of employees. Because he will be perceived as uncaring by his subordinates, the task leader will not make a good councilor. His subordinates will not trust their needs to this leader because the needs will not receive sufficient consideration. Since the task leader is not told about these needs, he will continue to focus his attention on the task, ignoring the nurturing aspects of leadership.

Likewise, the people-oriented manager, when faced with a given situation, will resolve any questions based on the impact they may have on the well-being of his subordinates. As tasks build up and employees are burdened to an ever increasing extent, the relationship manager will devote more and more effort to resolving the increasing personnel problems. [Ref. 4] In each of the scenarios above, the manager is faced with the task of balancing separate and possibly opposing requirements. Recent theories suggest that every manager has both orientations to some degree. Each conflict that arises must be resolved based on the strength of the particular manager's orientations. There are, however, additional conflicts that arise besides that of task versus relationship. Several studies have identified several types of conflict common in almost all organizations: [Ref. 5]

1. Intrasender conflict occurs when a single supervisor presents a subordinate with an incompatible set of orders or expectations.

2. Intersender conflict arises when orders or expectations from one person or group oppose the expectations from another person or group.

3. Inter-role conflict occurs when the different roles played by the same person give rise to conflicting demands.

4. Person-role conflict occurs when job role requirements run counter to the individual's needs or values.

5. Role overload conflict occurs when the individual is confronted with orders and expectations which cannot be completed within the given limits.

6. Role ambiguity occurs when the individual is provided with insufficient or unclear information about his responsibilities.

The effects of these conflicts on organizations and individuals is well documented. Role conflict and ambiguity causes decreased job satisfaction and increased anxiety. Ambiguity and inconsistency raises the anxiety of subordinates, causes less favorable attitudes towards supervision, and lowers productivity. [Ref. 6] John Senger recognized the existence of this role conflict and ambiguity problem in the U. S. Navy and attempted to document the manner in which the conflict was resolved aboard ships. Senger theorized that the social and task functions were divided between the Commanding Officer and Executive Officer. He encouraged industry to return to the concept of "assistant-to-the-president" in order to have a second-in-command available to facilitate the sharing of the social and task functions. The main point here is that the dual management recommended

by Senger is shared between the top two figures with line authority. [Ref. 7]

In the pre-Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command Navy, the only individual specifically tasked to see to the social and emotional needs of the enlisted personnel was the Commanding Officer. How he accomplished this function was through his chain of command, with a couple of safety valves (i.e. the Chaplain or the Commanding Officer's open-door policy). In every decision, the Commanding Officer had to weigh the factors of task requirement and social impact. In turn each of his subordinates had to balance these factors at a subordinate level. Sometimes the overall situation made it easy to balance the demands. More often, however, the demands created some degree of conflict. The conflict was normally identified at the junior management level. For example, the Chief Petty Officer would tell the division officer that task demands (paint chipping) were not reconcilable with the social needs (well deserved liberty) of the men. The division officer would either 1) pass the conflict to the department head, 2) make a decision in favor of either task or social requirements and accept the consequences, or 3) resolve the conflict in terms of some degree of compromise. This basic scenario can be applied to every aspect of the organizational and individual needs inherent aboard ships. The Chief Petty Officer of a division must continuously weigh the requirements for training, cleaning, maintenance, operation, socialization, individual fulfillment, recognition, reward, sense of belonging, and many others.

With the introduction of the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command program, the dual management idea takes on new meaning. The Commanding Officer (and Executive Officer depending on the individual arrangements) must still understand and resolve the conflicts of task and social-emotional needs of the ship. However, below the Commanding

Officer/Executive Officer level, the conflict is resolved via a structural change in the organization. The Commanding Officer and Executive Officer will without fail, delegate the task requirements to the chain of command. However, in a number of areas (as highlighted by Section C of CPNAVINST 5400.37C) the Commanding Officer and Executive Officer will delegate the social-emotional needs to the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command. The results of the senior officer interviews supports this theory. It is a wide spread practice to have the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command "supervise" or "run" the retention team, the awards board, the Sailor of the Month program, Family Services programs, and even the NJP review process. While almost every Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command conducted these programs "through the chain of command," very few stated that they routinely worked with the division officers or department heads. Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command generally took care of these "enlisted matters" by working with the Chief Petty Officers. Figures 2.5 and 2.6 demonstrate the impact of the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command program in terms of dual management. The pre-Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command diagram shows every echelon of the chain of command sharing the burden of role conflict.

The post-Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command diagram shows the task and social requirements being separated at the Commanding Officer/Executive Officer level and to a limited degree coming together again at the Chief Petty Officer level. Additional discussion on the role conflict resolution will be provided in each of the following chapters.




Figure 2.5 DUAL LEADERSHIP STRUCTURE: PRE-MCPOC.




Figure 2.6 DUAL LEADERSHIP STRUCTURE: POST-MCPOC.

III. POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE

Good Managers...are the keys to an organization's success.

are not motivated by a need for personal aggrandizement, or by a need to get along with subordinates, but rather by a need to influence others' behavior for the good of the whole organization.

want power.

[Ref. 8]

A. DEFINITIONS

The rather small amount of scholarly writing regarding power in organizations prior to the last decade indicates that this aspect of organizational reality was not well recognized. The quantity and diversity of the writings in recent years indicate that power is not well understood. Power is not tangible. You can not show it on an organizational chart. It is not easily measured by survey or interview. It may not be identified even over long periods of casual observation. Observed or not, it can be felt by all who have it and all who yield to it. Definitions of power vary among theorists. Generally, they agree that power is the ability of one person (or group) to influence the actions or beliefs of another person (or group). Some theorists qualify the definition by adding that the actions or

beliefs influenced would not otherwise have been taken or accepted; that the action is directed to desired outcomes; that power must be exercised to be present; or conversely that power does not have to be exercised to be present. [Ref. 9] For the purpose of this project, the author will use the following definition of power:

The ability (or potential) for one individual (or group) to influence the actions of another individual or group in a direction desired by the holder of power.

Authority is often used synonymously with power. While these concepts are closely related, an understanding of the difference between them is critical to an understanding of the political perspective of an organization. Authority is more structured and restricted than power. Authority can be used to influence others therefore, (in keeping with the definition above) it is a subset of power. Authority is generally vested in organizational positions and is transferred *quid pro quo* with succession of incumbents.

Finally, before discussing the political perspective of an organization, the term "politics" must be understood. Politics in the context of organizational reality does not necessarily involve kissing babies and making speeches as is normally attributed to the public arena. Organizational politics involves activities to gain, expand and utilize power which, coupled with other resources, is employed to influence the activities of the organization in the preferred direction of the power holders. [Ref. 10]

B. SOURCES OF ORGANIZATIONAL POWER

Assuming that individuals or groups in an organization will want to influence others in the direction of

organizational goals, it becomes critical to understand who can obtain power, how they can obtain power, from whom they can obtain power, and over whom they can exercise power. In turn, one must be able to identify the source(s) of power in that organization.

J. E. P. French and R. Raven have provided what is probably the most widely known theory of the sources of power. They identified six categories of sources: [Ref. 11]

1. Coercive power is based on the follower's perception that the power holder can punish him. The punishment can take many forms including: reduction in pay, suspension, termination, demotion, incarceration, etc. The punishment will be unpleasant and deny or reduce the follower of one or more of his preceived needs.

2. Reward power is based on the follower's perception that the power holder can reward him. The reward can also take many forms including: increased salary, improved work conditions, recognition, additional recreation time, promotion, etc. The reward will be pleasant and help fulfill or increase one or more of his preceived needs.

3. Expert power is based upon the followers belief that the power holder has special knowledge or expertise which can be used to meet the preceived needs of the fcllwer. For example, if a car owner can not repair his automobile engine, the local mechanic will enjoy power over the car owner. The power will be wielded to command monetary remuneration.

4. Referent power is based on the follower's desire to identify with a charismatic or respected person. The charismatic person holds power over the follower to the extent that he can influence the fcllwer's actions in return for the "privilege" of continued association. John F. Kennedy is certainly the most famous example of referent power but

referent power is also common place. Youngsters are often influenced to act out of character because of the referent power exercised by playmates.

5. Representative power is given to a person by another person or group with an implied agreement that the "followers" will continue to follow as long as the power holder stays within certain guidelines of group desires. The foreman of a jury is granted representative power by fellow jurors. He will retain this power as long as he stays within the general guidelines of the group desires (i.e. majority rule, and anonymity).

6. Legitimate power is based upon the follower's values which convince him that the power holder has a legitimate "right" to influence and that the follower is "bound" to accept. Legitimate power is the basis of the subset called authority. Emergency vehicles exercise legitimate power when they influence vehicles to pull over to the right hand side of the road. Automobile drivers do so because they know that it is the "right" thing to do.

A person may be able to influence another based on any one of the conditions listed above, or any combination of the bases. In organizations, management frequently exhibits power characteristic of several of the bases. Power acquired from one base augments and stabilizes power acquired from other bases. A corporate executive has power because employees believe it to be right for him to have power (legitimate); because he can hire, fire, and promote (reward and coercive); because he can give them inside information about corporate matters (expert); because they would like to be associated as being a part of his team (referent); and because he can engage in activities which will increase profits or some other measure of corporate well-being (representative). Individuals will obviously be influenced

more or less on different types of power depending on their relationship with the power holder.

Rosabeth Kanter has expanded on the French and Raven power source theory. She adds two additional or special sources of power which apply in an organizational context rather than an interpersonal situation. These organizational sources are: activities and alliances.

Activities as power source can be categorized into three basic types. Extraordinary activities are those engaged in for the first time, such as filling a new position, especially if the position is located in the higher levels of the management hierarchy. Involvement in organizational changes, either structural or personnel and participation in activities which involve personal or organizational risks will increase the power base of the employee. Visible activities increase an employee's power base by attracting attention or notice to what contributions the employee makes to the organization, thereby increasing the perceived dependence upon that employee. Visibility will actually serve as a multiplier or enhancer of other power bases. Relevant activities closely parallels visible and extraordinary activities. If an employee is engaged in activities which top management believes are "crucial" to the organization's well-being, the employee will enjoy extraordinary visibility and increased status and power. Kanter's activities concepts will be better understood after discussion on the power and dependency concept in the next section.

The second organizational source of power identified by Kanter is alliances. Alliances allow employees to pool or share power with fellow employees. Alliances can be established with peers, subordinates, or seniors. Alliances with peers can increase the ability one has to influence resources of an organization towards desired goals. Peer support will reduce the degree of dependence one has on

seniors or subordinates especially in meeting one's needs for affiliation and esteem. Alliances with subordinates enables one to extend his influence via the alliance network. Subordinates can improve the resources available to an allied boss for the execution of his tasks, again reducing his dependence on other sources. The greatest power enhancer is probably the third category of alliance, the alliance with a senior in the organizational hierarchy. An allied senior can provide significant information, visibility, and status.

A significant amount of power is available to the higher management levels of an organization. Managerial power is no different from power existing in any other relationship in so far as the sources of that power. However, it may be helpful to discuss managerial power in four general categories: [Ref. 9]

1. Formal positional powers exist as the legitimate rights, responsibilities, and prerogatives granted to managers. They are held responsible for many aspects of the organization therefore, they will have appropriately broad authority.
2. Resources can be used by management to reward or punish, increase or decrease dependence, and to improve the status of the project/workcenter or of a particular individual or group of individuals.
3. Control of decision premises enables managers to place constraints on the decisions made at lower levels. Not only the amount of decision premises controlled but the timing of the release of these premises can empower subordinates. Control of information is a special case of control of decision premises. Communications is the key to any organization. If there is no information flow, there is no organization. Information comes into the organization from

the environment. It is transmitted within the organization in numerous formal and informal ways. The more information relevant to the functioning of the organization that any single member has, the more power he will have within that organization.

4. Experience is the common term referred to in identifying a key trait of a successful manager. Experience is, in reality, the acknowledged opportunity an individual has had to obtain expertise, legitimacy, broad information, and many other assets which enhance power.

[Ref. 12]

One flaw in the French and Raven theory is the implicit treatment of power as an attribute of a person or as a static relationship between individuals. Personal traits, skills, positions, or expertise which may be relevant in one relationship may not be relevant in another. Likewise, within a given relationship, the relevance of a base of power in one situation may be entirely independent of the relevance of that base of power in another situation.

C. DEPENDENCE AND POWER

Relationships in every facet of social interaction are determined by mutual dependence. If there is absolutely no mutual dependence between individuals, they have no relationship and they exercise no influence on each other. The mutual dependence does not have to be significant to support a relationship. Two strangers entering an elevator are mutually dependent to the degree that the individuals want to be in a polite environment. The presence of the other passenger will influence each to abstain from "rude" behavior. Each passenger is in a position, to some degree, to grant or deny, facilitate or hinder, the other's wish. Power to influence the other is based upon the control over that which he values (environment). [Ref. 13]

Two variables function jointly to determine the dependence that one person will have upon another. The dependence of one person on another will increase proportionately with an increase in the importance of the needs met in that relationship. For example, a "casual" marijuana user will show very little dependence on a dealer while a heroin addict will show great dependence on his pusher. Dependence will decrease proportionately with an increase in the availability of other sources of need satisfaction. Continuing with the example above, if the heroin addict discovers other pushers willing to support his habit, his dependence on the original pusher is diminished.

Power can now be defined as the amount of resistance on the part of the follower which can be potentially overcome by the power holder because of the follower's dependence. This power does not have to be exercised to be present. When exercised, the power is not limited to the object of dependence. In the drug example, the sole supplier of heroin can influence the addict in matters of theft, prostitution, or numerous other "unrelated" aspects of the addict's behavior.

An important aspect of dependency based power is that one person does not have to be independent (or even less dependent) of the other in order to have power over that person. The obvious example is that of a marriage. Although the dependence may be perfectly mutual, each spouse has power to influence the other under various circumstances. Power is present but it is balanced at equal levels. Another possible situation could exist if one person enjoyed a power advantage over another. This situation can also exist in a perfectly satisfactory and balanced relationship. For example, in a romantic relationship, one person might have a much higher need for the affiliation provided in the relationship and therefore have

a greater dependence on the other person. The less dependent partner will exercise a power advantage over the more dependent. This relationship will remain in balance however, as long as the power advantage/disadvantage is proportionate to the independence/dependence relationship. When the power advantage is exercised, the more dependent partner may find that relationship unacceptable in its present form. Four changes in the relationship can occur which will bring the power back into balance:

1. The more dependent partner can devalue those needs met by the other, thereby reducing his dependency.
2. The more dependent partner can devalue the needs causing his resistance to the other thereby negating the need to exercise power.
3. The less dependent partner can increase the value of his needs met by the other thereby reducing the power advantage.
4. The less dependent partner can devalue his own needs (for which he was exercising power) thereby negating the need to exercise power.

D. POWER AND MANAGEMENT

The quotation at the beginning of this chapter states the necessity to give adequate attention to the power motivations of managers. Reducing that quotation somewhat makes the case even harder:

Good managers are the keys to an organization's success (and they) want power.

John Atkinson (1964) proposed a model of motivation based on the principle that adults apply their potential capabilities depending on their relative strengths in three basic drives:

The need for achievement motivates people to do things themselves; the desire to do something better or more efficiently than others can do it. This motivation will seek concrete, short-term feedback.

The need for affiliation motivates people to establish and nurture positive relationships with others. This motivation will seek comfortable processes and a safe and secure environment. The person motivated by affiliation needs makes a good "team player."

The final motivation identified by Atkinson is the power motivation. Power motivation is the desire to influence others. Unlike the achievement motivated person, the power motivation does not seek success in completing a task. Power motivation is aimed at getting a task complete, but not by one's own effort.

[Ref. 14]

In a study of American management motivation, managers participating in management workshops were categorized by their motivation drives and their relative success as judged by their seniors and peers. The conclusion was that managers will possess a high need for power. This need must be disciplined and directed toward the benefit of the organization rather than the personal aggrandizement of the manager. This need for power must be greater than the manager's need to be liked. The successful manager should influence others' successes more than achieve new goals himself or socialize with his subordinates. In this study, conducted by David McClelland and associates, not only was power motivation in managers found to be more important than affiliation in determining the organization's success, achievement needs were also found to be more critical than affiliation needs. The dominance of power motivation over affiliation motivation was evident in 80 percent of the "good" managers as compared to only 10 percent in the poorer managers. [Ref. 15]

Good managers have a need for power. Where does it come from? Managers obtain power from the same power sources as everyone else. See Table IV helps to summarize the organizational design factors which can enable or limit power distribution in an organization. The design of positions (or billets) at every level in the organization is important because power enables the employee to be productive. This is critically true for management positions. Managers need sufficient power and latitude to perform thier jobs well. [Ref. 12] If the distribution of power is not closely aligned with the distribution of organizational responsibilities, key members will not have sufficient power to execute their respnsibilities and the organization will not be effective.

E. POWER AND THE MASTER CHIEF OF THE COMMAND

While discussion of political considerations in the U. S. Navy may sound like heresy to many career Navymen, the only taboo broken would be the discussion, not the existence, of political reality in the Navy. Politics has enabled Admirals to become Chief of Naval Operations. There is nothing inherently wrong with that because the Chiefs of Naval Operations can use thier power for the good of the U. S. Navy and American citizens. On a smaller basis personnel assigned to ships have the same need for power at their level. In order to structure the discussion of the political implications of the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Ccmmand program, the author has divided shipboard personnel into five interest groups:

1. Ccmmanding Officer and Executive Officer
2. Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command
3. Chief Petty Officers
4. Enlisted Perscnnel

5. Junior Officers (including department heads)

While every power source will not be discussed for each group, those which the author feels are particularly affected by the program will be addressed in the following sections.

1. Commanding Officer and Executive Officer

The Commanding Officer and Executive Officer are grouped together because these are the two officers aboard a ship who exercise authority over the entire complement of personnel assigned, officer and enlisted. Each Commanding Officer and Executive Officer will have their own style of implementing the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command program, and will therefore experience some variations in the political impact of the program. In general, Commanding Officers and Executive Officers will act as a top team with shared interactions regarding the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command and all other matters.

What has been the effect of the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command program on the power of the Commanding Officer and Executive Officer? Obviously, the authority or legitimate power basis has not changed. The expertise of the Commanding Officer and Executive Officer has not been changed. The power to coerce is still present and the desire for people to be associated with the Commanding Officer and Executive Officer has probably not changed. The author, however, feels that many of the other power bases may have been altered.

The Commanding Officer and Executive Officer have always had the ability to reward personnel assigned to them. Rewards include: verbal praise letters, medals, increased promotion likelihood, and assistance in obtaining the best "next job." Prior to the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command program, the Commanding Officer and Executive

Officer relied upon the chain of command to initiate and sponsor rewards presented to the Commanding Officer and Executive Officer. The junior managers controlled the reward activities of the Commanding Officer and Executive Officer to the degree that they withheld information which might justify or negate reward considerations. For example, the Captain would tell the leading boatswain's mate that he did a good job, only when the First Lieutenant or Weapons Officer had informed him that the sailor was deserving of recognition. With the introduction and expansion of the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command program, the Commanding Officer and Executive Officer are now much more capable of applying rewards independent of the chain of command. In some cases they may even be more capable than the chain of command supervisors because the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command is not involved in the many task-related aspects of the job that the chain of command managers are. The Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command can therefore expend significantly more effort in looking for "rewardable" performance and in the administrative requirements to make those rewards come to fruition.

The Commanding Officer (and Executive Officer to a lesser degree) exhibits representative power when he speaks for his ship. If an Admiral comes on board and the Commanding Officer says, "We are happy to have you here," the crew will support the notion that the Commanding Officer is speaking for all hands. This power can be lost if the Commanding Officer overcommits himself. If the Commanding Officer were to introduce the Admiral and say, "We would like for you and your staff to arrange for us to serve as flagship for your upcoming deployment," the crew would disqualify his representation powers by numerous "under-breath" comments, means, and groans which would tell the Commanding Officer and the Admiral that the comment was not

representative of the crew. The Commanding Officer has always been able to speak as the representative of his ship to some degree. With the introduction of the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command, the Commanding Officer has a direct link to the enlisted community. Because this link is present, the Commanding Officer can speak "for the crew" with more credibility. When he approaches the point where he may threaten his representative power, the possibility that he really does have some empirical data to support his statement may prevent dissenters from voicing their objections.

One of the major advantages of the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command program is the alliance which the Commanding Officer can form with the Master Chief. The Commanding Officer can speak using not only his legitimate, expert, and other power; he now speaks with the implied concurrence of the man who's sole responsibility it is to watch for the welfare and morale of the enlisted community. All hands "know" that the Master Chief represents their best interest, so if he supports the Commanding Officer's position on some issue, personnel will more readily accept the position of the Commanding Officer. In industry, the same purpose would be served if Chrysler's Lee Iaccoca could present all policy matters with U.A.W. President Lane Kirkland standing at his side. In the Navy scenario, the Commanding Officer has the best of both worlds; he has the "employees'" representative standing beside him and he knows that the representative is going to be cooperative and supportive.

The Executive Officer has the opportunity to form an alliance of a somewhat different nature. Since the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command has no task responsibilities and, in accordance with the instruction is to be involved in most of the "people" programs, the Executive

Officer can increase the power base of the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command in exchange for the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command's assistance in many of the administrative/personnel matters which traditionally inundate Executive Officers.

The Commanding Officer and Executive Officer used to rely on the chain of command and informal lines of communications to obtain all of the information they required to effectively execute their duties. Likewise, all members of the command were dependent on the Commanding Officer and Executive Officer to provide the guidance and "strategic" focus upon which the routine operational decisions could be made. The Commanding Officer and Executive Officer held the decision premises over all others and the information was disseminated on a "need to know" basis. With the introduction of the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command program, the Commanding Officer and Executive Officer still maintain their control of information but they are now capable of providing that information to the Chief's mess or even the mess decks, without involvement of the chain of command. Figures 2.4 and 2.6 demonstrate these lines of communications.

The impact of the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command program is most obvious when the Commanding Officer and Executive Office evaluate their dependencies on the chain of command before and after the program. Indeed, the impetus for the original Senior Enlisted Advisor program was Admiral Zumwalt's desire to reduce his dependence on the chain of command for information regarding the enlisted community. With the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command actively and routinely attending to personnel matters, the Commanding Officer has the option of reducing his dependence on the department heads and division officers. If a particular Chief Petty Officer is not performing

in a satisfactory manner, the Commanding Officer can have the chain of command address the problem or he can opt to have the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command address the problem. The chain of command is no longer the sole source of management intervention. Therefore, the Commanding Officer's dependence on the chain is reduced.

2. Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command

The power shift in favor of the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command may seem obvious and precisely as intended by the sponsors of the program. However, in an effort to present a complete picture of the political perspective, the author feels obligated to cover this aspect. It is important to keep in mind that a great deal of power was exercised by the senior enlisted person long before the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command program. This power was often exercised in informal channels and was less high-lighted than it is under the new program but it was most certainly present.

The senior enlisted man of ten years ago had the ability to restrict liberty, take subordinates to task via the chain of command, and even put in a bad word to the Commanding Officer. The Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command of today meets regularly with the Commanding Officer and Executive Officer and can discuss any matter which might affect the enlisted community. The Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command can influence the Commanding Officer and Executive Officer on matters of reward, resource allocation, punishment, etc.

The degree to which the Commanding Officer and/or Executive Officer can be influenced by the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command will define the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command's coercive power. The opportunity to attempt to influence the Commanding Officer and

Executive Officer is present as it always has been. However, now there is little or no risk involved in the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command's attempt. If he is successful in his attempt to influence, he can bring significant punishment to bear. If he is not successful in his attempt, he is safe from reprisal because he is responsible only to the Commanding Officer and Executive Officer.

As in coercive power, the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command has reward power in proportion to his ability to influence the Commanding Officer and Executive Officer. Additionally, through his participation and/or chairmanship of the various personnel boards he can be the key factor in many awards. He will probably be the primary control point for the striker selection board, the Enlisted Surface Warfare Specialist board, the Awards board and others. Enlisted personnel interested in receiving these awards; and chiefs and officers interested in helping their assigned personnel in obtaining these awards, will have some dependence on the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command.

The expert power of the senior enlisted personnel of the Navy has always been recognized and is increasing as rapidly as the technical aspects of naval warfare. The expert power exercised by senior enlisted personnel is enhanced by the criticality of their rate and relevance of their job to mission accomplishment. On a guided missile cruiser, a chief boatswain's mate will exercise some expert power but possibly not a great deal. Place that same chief aboard an amphibious tank landing ship and his expert power will be routinely emphasized.

The Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command may come from any rating background. If he serves as a collateral duty Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command, he will retain the expert power base associated with his rate. He will also gain additional expert power as the "authority" on enlisted matters.

The referent power exercised by the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command is significant. The Commanding Officer and Executive Officer will want to be associated with the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command on a very positive basis. This relationship will serve as a symbolic statement of the Commanding Officer's interest and concern for the crew. If the Commanding Officer can not establish a good public image with the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command, he could lose a great deal of credibility with other enlisted personnel and with his seniors. Other people on the ship will also be concerned about having a good rapport with the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command. Fellow Chief Petty Officers will enjoy increased status if they associate with the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command. Since he is obviously successful and influential himself, if they are considered one of his "associates," they will gain also. The Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command enjoys increased power because of this situation.

By virtue of OPNAVINST 5400.37C, the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command is the representative of the enlisted community. The Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command is generally given a great deal of representative power but the power may not be indicative of his true ability to represent the enlisted community.

One of the most interesting and significant findings in the analysis of the NAVSURFIANT survey is that the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command may be poorly suited to fulfill the function of enlisted representative. There are persuasive indications that the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command has more in common with the Commanding Officer and Executive Officer than with the enlisted personnel. In fact, the responses to several of the questions (presented in Table III)

TABLE III

Survey Results Profile Comparisons

The contents of this table are excerpts from the survey results provided in Appendix E. The numbers in each row indicate the percentile breakdown of the groups indicated. The answers to questions 7, 8, and 9 indicate who the respondents feel would be the best official to handle a particular situation. The answers to questions 15, 16, and 22 indicate the degree to which respondents agree or disagree with some policy or aspect within their command. Note the relative similarity between of the percentile spread of Commanding Officers and MCFOC(S) as compared with other respondents.

Question 7

To whom to report racial discrimination

Commanding Officer	**	17	67	17	**
MCFOC	07	07	67	07	13
Seamen/Firemen	07	27	19	25	22

Question 8

Obtaining "feel" for crew reaction to policy

Commanding Officer	**	**	99	**	**
MCFOC	**	**	93	07	**
Seamen/Firemen	13	29	40	16	02

Question 9

Who best understands enlisted values

Commanding Officer	17	**	17	17	50
MCFOC	07	**	29	21	43
Department Head	**	20	40	15	25

Question 15

Appropriateness of CPO privileges

Commanding Officer	**	17	83	**	**
MCFOC	13	20	60	07	**
Seamen/Firemen	03	11	57	20	08

Question 16

Appropriateness of junior officer privileges

Commanding Officer	**	**	99	**	**
MCFOC	07	07	67	20	**
Division Officer	12	32	48	07	02

Question 22

How well is chain of command enforced

Commanding Officer	40	60	**	**	**
MCFOC	40	33	13	**	13
Seamen/Firemen	06	24	41	17	12

indicate that the traditional chain of command is more

likely to understand the needs and motivations of the junior enlisted man than is the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command. These results are discussed in detail in the human resources perspective. Regardless of the accurateness of the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command's representation, he still enjoys significant representative power because he is the designated representative and unless he misuses this power, he will be able to rely on it.

Any Commanding Officer who has ever commanded successfully has understood the power and importance of his senior enlisted man. Every good Commanding Officer makes the effort to establish some informal communications with his key chiefs and others. The Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command program added a legitimate label to a relationship which has always been critical. The Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command not only influences the Commanding Officer outside the chain of command, he does so legitimately because of the program.

The Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command activities are a key ingredient of his power. His attendance at department head meetings, presence at ceremonies, and participation in the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command chain of command defines his role in the organization as one involved in the "strategic" management of the organization. The wide variety of activities and the lack of any routine requirements shows people that he is not confined to operational agendas. The only personnel on board who demonstrate a wider range of activities are the Commanding Officer and Executive Officer (and maybe not even the Executive Officer). Table IV presents a listing of job design factors and the way they affect power distribution. Note that task variety, relation of tasks to current problem areas, focus of tasks, and participation in conferences and meetings add to the power base of the individual.

The asterisk indicate the author's interpretation of where the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command billet, as described in OPNAVINST 5400.37C, is relative to each design factor.

TABLE IV
Billet Design Contributions to Power

This table summarizes the impact of certain organizational activities and billet design factors. The asteriks represent the author's estimate of how the MCPOC " rates " on each factor.

ROLE ACTIVITIES DESIGN FACTORS	Generates Power When Factor Is	Generates Powerless -Ness When Factor Is
Rules inherent in the job	few ***	many
Precedents in the job	few ***	many
Established routines	few ***	many
Task variety	high***	low
Rewards for reliability	few ***	many
Rewards for innovation	many	few ***
Flexible use of people	high ***	low
Approvals needed for nonroutine decisions	few	many***
Relation of tasks to current problem areas	central ***	peripheral
Focus of tasks	outside	inside***
Physical location	central ***	distant
Job activity publicity	high ***	low
Interpersonal contact	high ***	low
Contact with seniors	high ***	low
Participation in programs, conferences, meetings	high ***	low
Task force participation	high ***	low
Advancement prospects of subordinates (N.A.)	high	low
(N.A. for MCPOC since he has no subordinates) [Ref. 12]		

With the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command

working directly with the Commanding Officer and Executive Officer, he has an excellent opportunity to form alliances with these officers. He has the opportunity to form other alliances with department heads, division officers, chief petty officers, and the entire crew. Most likely, however, the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command is going to most closely align with the Commanding Officer and his fellow Chief Petty Officers. There are excellent reasons for this alliance preference.

1. The Commanding Officer is most likely the man closest in age and experience (length of service) to the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command.
2. Both men are more likely than others to have obtained the positions for which they had set goals in their early adult years.
3. Both men are essentially free from peer competition on board their unit.
4. Both men are beyond the administrative, mundane, and routine aspects of management.

As demonstrated by Table III, the results of the COMNAVSURFLANT survey strongly indicate an alliance of interests and opinions between the Commanding Officer and Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command. While the results listed in the table are not statistically significant, the author believes that they do indicate a closeness of beliefs and opinions between Commanding Officers and Master Chief Petty Officer of the Commands which supports their alliance formation.

Despite the broad interests and activities assigned to the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command, directives do not specifically assign any personnel resources for his control. In reality, the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command draws whatever resources he may require from personnel assigned to divisions.

The Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command obtains information from all levels: the Commanding Officer, the Executive Officer, group, and/or force Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command, chiefs quarters and individual sailors. He is present at many meetings, including department head meetings. The information he acquires from all of these sources may be very useful to others who do not have these information resources. The Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command exercises considerable power based upon his access to decision premises. He knows why decisions were made and what factors were taken into account. In the author's opinion this could very well be his greatest tool.

3. Chief Petty Officers

The Chief Petty Officers have experienced effects of the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command program in several ways. The senior Chief Petty Officer has traditionally held the position (either explicitly or implicitly) of "Mess President" for the Chief's Mess. He was traditionally the chief to officiate at Chief Petty Officers' initiations, and to speak for the Chief's mess when requested. The Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command program has however, altered the traditional position, at least in degree.

Prior to the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command program, the Chief Petty Officers could exercise coercive power on subordinates to whatever degree he felt that his chain of command would support him. There was, of course, the ability for every sailor to go beyond each level in the chain until reaching the Captain. The sailor might risk repercussions for going "over the head" of some officials, but he could weigh those risks against his needs for a certain decision and proceed accordingly. The chief also

often exercised coercive power over his division officer. The chief could go over the division officer's head and appeal to the department head. Not only would the division officer risk having his decision overturned, but there was a risk that the department head would see the officer as unable to manage his division. The chief could also coerce certain division officer action by the implicit threat to not support the officer in his tasks which for most division officers, would be a significant penalty.

The coercive power of individual chiefs has been enhanced in some respects and reduced in others by the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command program. Because the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command provides the Commanding Officer direct inputs, the chief can utilize this access to whatever extent his alliance with the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command will allow. The chief has the ability to provide uncomplimentary information to the Commanding Officer via the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command. On the other hand, the chief is exposed to a degree of coercive power from those who work for him. The sailors in his division can also use the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command to pass uncomplimentary information to the chief's supervisors. Overall, one would expect the chief's power base to be increased since he will have more contact and an informal relationship with the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command.

The increased reward power base exercised by the chief closely parallels the reward power of the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command. The chief has an alternative communications route available to the Commanding Officer and Executive Officer if he wants to gain reward for one of his men. Again, this can serve to enhance his position or reduce his power base: if individuals who normally rely on the chief for rewards now receive rewards from the Master

Chief Petty Officer of the Command, then the Chief is no longer the only source of reward. For example, if the Division Chief granted early liberty on Fridays when the division had worked especially hard, he could obtain a certain amount of influence over his division towards performing well. If the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command can obtain liberty for the crew or even that division from the Commanding Officer, the influence of the Chief's reward is reduced. On the other hand, if the Chief wanted to grant extra liberty but could not (or even believed that he could not) because of his division officer and the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command persuaded the Commanding Officer that the division deserved liberty, the Chief's reward power would be enhanced. It is important to note that none of the players have to know the wishes of the others or the existence of any conflicts. The division officer above does not have "to lose" in order for the Chief to gain. The division officer may be perfectly willing to hold early liberty but since he was not involved in the process, he will not gain the reward influence; the Chief will.

Each of the other power sources of the Chief are affected by the increased status of the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command but three stand out as critical to all of them. These three are: alliances, decision premises, and dependence.

The Chief Petty Officers' mess is traditionally a very close-knit group. They eat, sleep, and relax in very close quarters. They are distinguished from other enlisted personnel and officers by their uniforms, age (in general), and many other factors. The Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command is their representative to the Commanding Officer. Everyone on board knows this and everyone assumes that the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command has a

loyalty to his fellow Chief Petty Officers. The individual Chief Petty Officers therefore, are assumed to have an alliance with the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command. All Chief Petty Officers therefore enjoy an allied power source even if they do not have a particularly favorable relationship with the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command.

The Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command has direct communications to the Commanding Officer. The Chief Petty Officers have direct communications with the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command. If the Chief Petty Officers have a question regarding the reasoning or intention of a command policy, the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command can directly inquire for them. The Commanding Officer can explain his position in an informative way rationalizing that the chain of command did not adequately inform the Chief Petty Officers. The Chief Petty Officers will eventually get an understanding of the situation from the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command. The chain of command, on the other hand, may not be able to question the Commanding Officer's reasoning for fear of reprisal. This situation may very well have been a key factor in the communications failure of the early 1970's. It will be addressed again with regards to junior officers. It is obvious, however, that the Chief Petty Officers have excellent access to the decision premises at the command level. The survey results (Question 31, Appendix E) indicate that a significant majority of Chief Petty Officers and officers feel that the word received in the Chief Petty Officers' mess is more accurate than the word received via the chain of command. This belief gets stronger as the respondents become more distant from the Commanding Officer in the traditional chain of command.

The dependence base for the Chief Petty Officers has been shifted by the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command program in a very similar fashion as decision premises and information flow. A key factor here is that the Chief Petty Officers are managers and managers need information to be effective. The Chiefs know this and they know that there is another very active and effective conduit for this information from the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command. Their dependence on the chain of command has therefore been reduced.

4. Enlisted Personnel

The original purpose of the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command program and its predecessor, the Senior Enlisted Advisor was to ensure a representative enlisted input was provided to the Commanders and Commanding Officers so that they could better guarantee the morale and well-being of the troops. The human resources aspects of the enlisted community have improved in many ways and will be discussed in Chapter V. Has the power base for the enlisted community improved? Are enlisted personnel better able to influence their job situation than they were before the program began?

The coercive power base of the enlisted personnel has increased in relation to their dealings with the chain of command. As applied to the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command and Chief Petty Officers, the enlisted personnel have an alternative route to the Commanding Officer which will give them a relatively safe method to seek reversals of decisions or redresses for felt-wrong done by someone in the chain of command. This fact will reduce the probability that a taskmaster chief or division officer will go too far. The gain enjoyed by enlisted personnel is really a reflection of the reduced coercive powers of the chiefs and offi-

cers. The author does not see any significant changes in reward, expert, referent, representative, legitimate, or activity bases. Enlisted personnel do benefit from the implied alliance with the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command. Again, this is really indicative of a reduced power advantage for the officers and chiefs. Also, as mentioned previously, the author suspects that the real alliance of the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command will be with the Commanding Officer and chiefs, not the junior enlisted personnel. The most significant power base increase for the enlisted community is the additional decision premises (information) which the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command can generate and provide. The Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command can provide strategic rationale for many of the events which may have been hard to understand before. The more information sailors have, the better they will be able to perform their tasks.

As may seem reasonable and appropriate to many, a key issue in the political perspective from the standpoint of the enlisted personnel is dependency. Enlisted personnel have relatively specific job requirements. They supervise fewer personnel and therefore require less influence ability on organizational issues. Enlisted personnel are afforded less authority than chiefs and officers. Because they are less influential or powerful, however, does not require them to be more dependent on others for their own well-being and individual needs. The greatest fallacy, in the author's opinion, regarding the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command program is the belief that the Navy has reduced the enlisted man's dependency or improved his ability to provide for his needs. The enlisted community (with the possible exception of the chiefs) has no more and no less influence or power than the community has ever had. The effect of the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command program has been

to shift some of that dependency away from the chain of command in favor of the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command. The overall result of this situation will be discussed in Chapter V and the summary.

5. Junior Officers

In discussing the political effects of the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command program on junior officers, the author is grouping together managers with diverse experience and backgrounds. The term "Junior Officer" as used in this project, refers to newly commissioned Ensigns and Warrant Officers with twenty years of experience; officers serving as Assistant CIC Officer and as Operations Officer. The only real common bond among the group is that they are commissioned officers who have a subunit of a ship (department, division, etc.) for which they are held accountable. In general, the illustrations will involve a typical division officer as the junior officer unless a significantly different situation exists for department heads, limited duty or warrant officers.

Coercive power for the junior officer has often been at the root of leadership problems. Many junior officers come into the fleet with very little experience in any work environment. They are immediately tasked to provide leadership and management to a group of sailors, many of whom are more experienced and most of whom are better educated in the technical aspects of the job. The junior officer is most likely still aware of his own indoctrination experience. The use of coercive power may seem like the most logical tool for getting things done. The junior officer may be experiencing coercion from his superiors to attain some qualification or get something done before liberty. The implied (and often specific) message is "Perform, or else." The junior officer lives in a coercive world. The misuse of

coercive power is not at all unusual. To significantly reduce the misuse of this type of unconstructive power is a noble and very worthy cause in the U. S. Navy. Does the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command program help in this area?

The junior officer has coercive power over his subordinates in exactly the same manner in which the Chief Petty Officer does. He can threaten to punish or withhold reward from his subordinates to whatever extent his chain of command will support him. The junior officer can threaten to take a sailor to mast or restrict him to the ship for some behavior which the junior officer wants to influence on the part of the sailor. The threat will have influence only to the extent that the sailor believes that the department head, Executive Officer, and Commanding Officer will support the junior officer. Because the sailor is close in age, experience, and credibility to the junior officer, he will be more willing to "test" the coercive power by taking the issue to another level in the chain of command. With the introduction of the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command program, the sailor has an alliance with someone who can contact the senior echelons of management to gain a redress for unjust coercion. The Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command is a safeguard against undue coercive power. The Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command therefore, reduces the coercive power base of the junior officer.

The reward power of the junior officer has been affected by the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command program in two basic ways. First, the junior officer used to be the critical link between those managers who observed rewardable performance (Chief Petty Officers) and those in authority to actually reward (Commanding Officer, Executive Officer). With the presence of the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command, the junior officer is not the

critical link. The fact that another route is available reduces the dependency on the junior officer. The second major area in which the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command program affects the reward power of the junior officer is the position of the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command on the various boards which consider rewards. The Enlisted Surface Warfare Specialist, Sailor of the Quarter, striker boards and the designated awards board are examples.

The expert power of the junior officer has essentially been unchanged by the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command program. Other factors, however, have affected this power base for the junior officer. With the ever increasing technology of naval warfare, the junior officers are being pushed to become more and more technically proficient in their jobs. Gunnery officers of years gone by, supervised and coordinated the employment of turrets and mounts. Today, the junior officer in the Combat Systems department is more likely to be assigned to actually sit at an NTDS console and perform the "manual" aspects of gunfire while being supervised by a Tactical Action Officer rather than supervise a gun mount crew. The expert power for the job has increased because of this trend.

Another power base which the author believes has expanded for the junior officer is that of representation. Historically, the junior officer was distinguished from enlisted personnel by differences in education, background, financial status, social status, and many other trappings of his position (RHIP: Rank Hath Its Privileges). In today's Navy, many of these differences have narrowed. While a college degree is not held by a majority of enlisted personnel, many have a significant number of undergraduate credits. The technical training received by enlisted personnel which is necessary to meet the needs of the Navy

also serves to close the education gap. The competitive selection process of colleges and universities and the availability of various financing opportunities for education have provided a better cross-section of college graduates and therefore a better cross-section of junior officers. The pay incentives over the past six to seven years have effectively narrowed the financial gap between junior officers and enlisted personnel. Regulations have changed in favor of better habitability and messing and more personal freedoms (civilian clothes, for example). All of these improved conditions have helped to bolster the esteem of the enlisted man. At the same time, the "privileges" of rank have deteriorated for the junior officer. Plushly decorated wardrooms attended to by stewards, formally served meals, and staterooms attended to by stewards have all disappeared. The result has been a decrease in the "esteem" demonstrated by the command for the junior officer. Again, the gap between enlisted and junior officer has narrowed.

With the overall affect of the narrowed gap discussed above, the junior officer has gained in one very important power base. The junior officer is seen more and more as a part of the division "team" rather than an outsider. Because of this better relationship, the enlisted personnel are more inclined to allow the junior officer to speak for the group. They believe that the junior officer does have some idea of their interests and concerns and trust him to represent their best interests.

The activities of the junior officer have changed over the last couple of decades. The author does not presume to imply that these changes have been a result of the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command program entirely. Indeed, there is a logical argument that the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command program has changed as a result of the activities of junior officers.

That the two have evolved simultaneously however, is sufficient reason to investigate the overall impact without pursuing a "cause and effect" relationship.

As discussed earlier, the junior officer is participating more and more in the technical aspects of naval warfare. The decreased reaction time, increased complexity of the threat, increased technology of sensor and weapon systems, and the possibly catastrophic results of miscalculation or delay have mandated that the Navy put the "top team" on watch at all times. To enhance watch teams, ships have department heads (as Tactical Action Officers) supervising other junior officers functioning as CIC watch officers, Ship's Weapons Coordinators, Anti-Submarine Warfare Watch Officers, and other specific and technically demanding roles. The necessity to function well in these capacities was the driving force behind the Surface Warfare Officer qualification program and is the driving factor in the increased technical training required of officers. Overall, the junior officer is spending significantly more time in activities requiring expertise and achievement on a personal basis rather than activities involved in management and group leadership. The activities of the junior officer indicate that he is involved in the operating aspects of the ship's business rather than the strategic or tactical aspects. In this area, the department heads are probably in a distinctly different situation than the division officers. Department heads' activities are indicative of tactical concerns rather than operating concerns.

Decision premises for the junior officer are supplied by the chain of command. The department head relies on the Commanding Officer or Executive Officer, the division officer relies on the Executive Officer and his department head. The dependence of the junior officer on the chain of command has not changed. What has changed as

result of the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command program is that the junior officer's subordinates no longer rely solely on the chain of command for information on which to make decisions. As discussed earlier, the Chiefs obtain information from the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command and pass it on to the sailors. Under these conditions, it is not unusual for the chief to be able to provide information to the junior officer which should have come from the junior officer.

Without doubt, the most significant power base loss for the junior officer is that of dependency. The junior officer still depends on his subordinates for the accomplishment of his mission. He still depends on his seniors for the resources and support needed to accomplish his mission. However, his subordinates no longer rely solely, or even primarily, on the junior officer to meet their needs. The Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command program and many of the other "personnel" programs have organizationally reduced sailor's dependency on the chain of command for individual needs. This reduction of dependency has resulted in a significant reduction in the junior officer dependency power base. What is the effect of this reduction in power?

People held accountable for the results produced by others, whose formal role gives them the right to command but who lack informal political influence, access to resources, outside status, sponsorship, or mobility prospects, are rendered powerless in the organization...they lack control over their own fate and are dependent on others above them.

[Ref. 16]

While the author does not intend to imply that the junior officer community is "powerless", the author does

believe that the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command program is indicative of a reduced power base for the junior officer and is concerned with the degree to which they may "lack control..."

IV. SYMBOLIC PERSPECTIVE

A. THEORY AND BACKGROUND

Top executives do not drive trucks, run machines, or chip paint. They deal in symbols. [Ref. 17]. Symbols provide a means for managing organizational culture and values which can not be effectively managed by conventional management tools. Symbols tell employees and observers about what counts in the organization. Symbols tell individuals where they fit into the organization relative to others. [Ref. 10] Symbols can be acts, words, or objects used to represent something entirely apart from the act, word, or object. Some common types of symbols include: language, logos, rituals, humor, play, ceremonies, myths, time, clothing, and several aspects of physical space, such as location, size, and decor. Table V provides an example of each of the symbols listed. Traditional theories of organizations depict a rational and linear connection between organizational activities, events, and outcomes. Decisions made by leaders solve problems. Organizational structure is determined to best coordinate activity. Organizational authority is given to personnel in response to the organizational function which they perform. The rational and linear relation between organizational activities or structure and outcomes is not supported in the symbolic perspective. Leaders produce "decisions" to problems not as a solution but rather as a ritual of leadership, for example, many "decisions" made by a Commanding Officer are really rubberstamping an Executive Officer or department head decision.

TABLE V
Samples of Symbology

Language.....	"Walk softly and carry a big stick," in a very brief phrase told the American people and others a great deal about the personality and values of President Teddy Roosevelt.
Logo.....	Wearing a sport-shirt with a polo-player or alligator on the left breast is interpreted by many as saying something about the style of the person wearing the shirt.
Ritual.....	Piping-aboard of a senior officer demonstrates a ship's respect for his position and acknowledges the importance of his visit.
Humor/Play....	Teasing of a junior member of an organization ("George" Ensign) tells him that he is accepted as a member and that the lack of experience within the group is not adversely considered.
Ceremonies....	The wedding ceremony tells the public that the individuals have chosen to live together under the conditions (love, honor, cherish) of the institution performing the marriage.
Time/Access...	The personal secretary to a CEO is afforded significantly more consideration than other secretaries simply because of the time spent with access to the CEO.
Clothing.....	The military rank insignia is an obvious example, however, civilians have their examples also. MacDonald's managers wear civilian attire while all others are required to wear uniforms.
Physical Space	
A) Size.....	The executive with a 20' x 40' office will be higher in the organizational structure than one who has a 5' by 10' cubby.
B) Location:....	Penthouses generally accommodate Chief Executives.
C) Decor:.....	The supervisor who conducts business from across a large Mahogany desk will elicit a different response from one who sits beside an employee on a folding chair.

Structure can be used to reduce uncertainty and ambiguity regarding the fit between individuals and the organization. Authorities and responsibilities can be shifted to demonstrate who holds power in the organization. Symbols can be used to create organizational culture or myths. These myths express the desires, unexpressed or unconscious wishes, and ambivalencies of those who perpetuate the myths. Many Commanding Officers have proclaimed to their crew that their ship was "the best in the Navy." The Commanding Officer has no empirical data and maybe even no illusion to support this claim but that matters little, if at all. The Commanding Officer is expressing his desire for his ship to be the best and he is trying to "sell" this belief or desire to his crew. If the myth is accepted by the crew, it will provide a source of cohesion, esteem, and purpose.

Cultural myths help to mediate ambivalence or contradictions. For example, despite the American expressed dismay at the Russian invasion of Afghanistan in 1980, a significant majority of Americans strongly supported the American invasion of Grenada in 1983. While the example may seem absurd, it was the American myth as "Defender of Democracy" and "Protector of the West", that allowed Americans to quickly resolve the "difference" between the two events. Persons who are not familiar with the American myths, such as Soviet citizens or Third World peoples probably saw the two events as being very similar.

Now that we know what symbols are, how can we apply them to the organization? The effective leader can use symbols to act out the vision or goals which he seeks for the organization. If the executives are focusing on the strategic concerns of the organization, they will not have time to involve themselves in the more routine aspects of the organization's activities. Symbolic behavior can effectively and convincingly tunnel the energies of subordinates in the

direction of strategic goals. Middle and junior executives can now supervise the tactical or operational implementation of the goals without further significant involvement from top management. But what symbolic behaviors best enable the executive in conveying strategic direction?

The executive's priorities will best be displayed by the manner in which he allocates his time. Actions speak louder than words. As Eli Ginsberg and Ewing W. Reilley noted: "Those a few exhelons from the top are always alert to the chief executive. Although they attach importance to what he says, they will be truly impressed only by what he does." [Ref. 18] The chief executive can state that he is very interested in improving the work environment for his employees. Very little is likely to happen. However, let the chief executive fire a plant supervisor for poor environmental conditions and the entire organization will be committed to environmental improvement almost immediately. The action does not have to be dramatic to be effective. The same chief executive could note a few specific discrepancies and include them as agenda items at the next management meeting. Managers will note that the chief executive really is interested in environment. If that same chief executive expresses his interest in work environment but evaluates, rewards and promotes based on cost reductions, all of the "would-be-chief executives" will turn off air conditioners and heaters to reduce costs.

Another significant symbolic tool for the chief executive is the use he makes of his personal staff and key officers. The size of his staff, their prerequisites, and their perogatives will demonstrate his goals and his style. If his staff is large and relatively free to investigate all areas of the organization, the chief executive will be seen as involved and concerned with the on-going routine operational procedures. If the personal staff is relatively

confined to "headquarters" activities, the chief executive demonstrates his reliance on divisional executives to handle operating matters while he focuses on "headquarters" matters.

Augmenting the symbolic tools discussed above, frequency and consistency can multiply the effects of symbolic leadership. In the example of concern for work environment, the inclusion of environment subjects on the first agenda will cause subordinates to stop and consider the issue. If a legitimate environment item (not necessarily negative) appears on the agenda every third or fourth meeting, the subordinates will incorporate the issue as part of the organizational culture. The executive committed to change should be constantly on the lookout for opportunities to reinforce activities which support his strategic goals. [Ref. 17]

Settings are another tool used by leaders. A chief executive may want to convey his belief that assembly line workers are the "backbone" of the company. He could send out a memo via the chain of command, provide a message to the company newspaper, or even provide his message directly to the foreman of the assembly line. His message will have little impact on the workers. If however, the chief executive stands in front of the assembled workers at the assembly line, his message will not only be communicated, they will also be demonstrated. If the boss wants to emphasize the strategic importance of any aspect of the organization, he must be seen involved in that aspect because he personifies the strategic interests of the company.

Symbology is a powerful tool for the executive. While other methods can be used to incrementally adjust the day to day activities of the organization, symbology may be the most useful tool making dramatic and relatively permanent changes in a strategic direction. There is a significant

consideration in the use of the frame. As useful as it obviously is, it can also be extremely dangerous. Symbology can act as a double-edged sword. It can be purposely used to misdirect the energies of constituents. It can accidentally be employed with disastrous results. The user of symbology must understand all aspects of its employment. For example, on May 28, 1984 an unidentified serviceman killed in Viet Nam was entombed at Arlington National Cemetery at the Tomb of the Unknowns. The ceremony as originally intended was to serve as a statement of the nation's recognition of the sacrifices made by the soldiers and sailors who gave up their lives in American wars. Despite the inability to attach a name with each body, the citizens of America honored all "unknown" as heroes. This widely respected symbolic gesture has been accepted since the entombment of the first Unknown in 1923. The entombment of this serviceman has been seen by many in a different light. For many Americans, the ceremony was the final chapter in a war which was very unpopular and traumatic for the country. In many ways this parallels the traditional symbology of funerals--the end of the tragic loss of a loved one. To other Americans, the ceremony symbolized an unacceptable change of American policies. Wives, children, and friends of men still listed as "missing in action", saw the ceremony as the American government prematurely closing the book on Viet Nam. Some had been seeking government support and more pressure on the Vietnamese in hopes of finding loved ones or at least the remains. For them the symbology was not a "coming to term" but rather a denial of continued responsibility to resolve the unanswered questions. Symbology is powerful and cuts many different ways.

B. SYMBOLIC IMPACT OF THE MASTER CHIEF PETTY OFFICER OF THE COMMAND

Much of the symbolic impact of the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command program has been discussed in the previous chapters. In each of the other perspectives, the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command program is a generally minor organizational change if the program and its functions are taken exactly as promulgated. The author paralleled the structural impact of the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command program to a structural shift from divisional responsibilities to functional responsibilities in which the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command had the functional area of enlisted personnel concerns. The author is aware that neither Admiral Zumwalt nor any of his successors ever considered such a specific structural change. The argument for the effect of "functional structure" is based solely on the symbolic interpretation of the program. For this reason, the symbolic impact of the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command program will be discussed in subsections, each of which may be somewhat redundant of the previous three chapters, but considered necessary. Additionally, the types of symbols listed in Table V will be compared with various aspects of the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command program.

1. Symbolic Structure

The language of the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command program (CPNAVINST 5400.37C) clearly states that the program was designed not to interfere with the traditional chain of command. The instruction states:

Functioning as senior enlisted advisors to the commander/commanding officer, working within the chain of command, Fleet, Force, and Command Master Chiefs strengthen the traditional single chain of command by keeping the commander/Commanding Officer aware of existing or potential situations, procedures, and practices which affect the welfare and morale of Navy men and women under that command's cognizance. [Ref. 19]

The instruction also indicates that there is not a second chain of command in addition to the "traditional single" one. While in one aspect the intent is to suggest that the traditional chain of command will not be threatened, the second message comes across that there is now a formal alternative structure to the traditional chain. The interpretation of what this second formal structure does to the organization as a whole is not easily identified. The Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command participates in matters "which affect the welfare and morale..." If this is seen as his function, then it would be logical to see his structural role as functional vice divisional. The concept of dual management can be applied if individuals define "Welfare and morale" as "relationship orientation" with the traditional chain of command attending to task-oriented matters. With the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command reporting to the Commander/Commanding Officer, delegation of enlisted matters via the traditional chain of command is less critical. The Commanding Officer, assisted by his staff specialist on enlisted morale and welfare will tend to this matter himself. The Commanding Officer has "his" own representative at the various committees and has no need to depend on the Chairman or officers present to either represent him or advise him on subject matters.

Another symbolic structural consideration that is extremely important in the author's opinion is that the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command functions as the

"senior enlisted" person at a command. He represents "them" to the Commanding Officer. The Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command program highlights a difference between "them" and "the command". If observers interpret this as a difference between individual personal goals and the goals of the organization, then the difference is merely a statement of fact and a difference with which every organization must deal. If, on the other hand, observers interpret the difference as between the traditional chain of command and the enlisted community, the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command program is defining the team leader for the enlisted team in an "us versus them" organization. Why must the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command represent the needs of the enlisted community to the Commanding Officer? The young recruit might answer that question by saying "I guess because the officers won't do it."

The final structural consideration in the symbolic frame is the affect that the program has on the position of the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command himself. If the purpose of the program was to help keep the Commanding Officer "in touch" with the enlisted community, then the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command ought to himself be "in touch" with the enlisted community. If the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command is charged to be directly responsible to the Commanding Officer/Executive Officer, not assigned to divisional duties, work with the Commanding Officer/Executive Officer in the dissemination and promotion of "command" policy, attend meetings and participate in ceremonies, then he will not be "in touch" with the enlisted community. He will be "in touch" with the Commanding Officer and other Master Chief Petty Officer of the Commands. The junior enlisted man may see the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command as the top management team.

2. Symbolic Power

The previous chapter discussed in great details the numerous sources of power and influence which can be exercised at various times by people in an organization. Many of the suggested explications of the effects of the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command program in the political perspective were based upon the author's interpretation of the symbolic impact of the program. This section will attempt to demonstrate the political interpretations of the types of symbols found in and around the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command program.

The language of the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command is provided by OPNAVINST 5400.37C. According to that instruction, the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command

.....has proven to be valuable asset in stimulating free flow cmmunications at all levels within the chain of command.

.....working within the chain of command...strengthen the traditional single chain of command...

.....ccmmanding officer's principal enlisted advisor in formulation and implementation of policies concerning morale, welfare, job satisfaction, discipline, utilization, and training of Navy's men and women.

.....working with the internal chain of command as directed by the ccmmander/commanding officer.

.....takes precedence over all other enlisted members within a command.

.....ccmmanders/ccmmanding officers will provide

1. visibility
2. office space and clerical support .
3. Attendance at appropriate seminars and conferences...

[Ref. 19]

The language is very clear that the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command is not a part of the traditional chain of command. The language goes on to stress the

intent of the program is not to threaten the traditional chain of command. The language acknowledges that there is concern for the impact of the program on the chain of command.

The language of the program is very power oriented. The instruction places great emphasis on the symbols of power. Access to the commanding officer must be direct and expansive. The Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command will be involved in policy matters from formulation through implementation. The Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command will be given visibility and office space. The Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command will take precedence over all other chiefs. All of this power language is symbolic evidence that the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command is part of top management.'

The logo of the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command program is the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command pin. The fact that the pin exists is rather unimportant. The true symbology of the pin is that the pin is worn in the same manner as a command-at-sea pin. The pin appears to be the enlisted command-at-sea equivalent.

Ceremonies involved with the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command program include inspections, reception of visitors, and awards ceremonies among others. Traditionally, the Commanding Officer is presented a division for inspection by the junior officer in charge of that division. The Commanding Officer and division officer then inspect together with the Commanding Officer making remarks to the individual sailor and/or the division officer. The department head and Executive Officer would follow behind and generally were not addressed by the Commanding Officer. Today, the Commanding Officer is generally accompanied to inspection by the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command. The division officer still presents

the division and leads the Commanding Officer through the inspection line. The Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command often follows directly behind the Commanding Officer. The symbology shows the troops that the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command is a key figure in the opinion of the Commanding Officer. The Commanding Officer wants the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command involved in major issues of the enlisted community. The Commanding Officer respects the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command's opinion.

Many of the Commanding Officers interviewed stated that having the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command at inspections served another purpose. The Commanding Officers often direct questions and comments to the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command because the Master Chiefs were usually the best informed concerning uniform regulations and procedures. The Commanding Officers felt that if the department head or division officer agreed with the Commanding Officer's comments, the man being inspected would feel like they were merely playing to the Captain's whims but by involving the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command, the man being inspected would see that an "unbiased" or even "pre-enlisted" opinion agreed with the Commanding Officer's comment. The Commanding Officers also said that division officers tend to say "yes, sir" and "No excuse, sir" too often while the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command had a better understanding of the situation and would tell the Commanding Officer if there was a reasonable explanation, such as "I agree, Captain, but the ship's store has not had shoe polish for three months." The symbolic implications of an inspection conducted in this manner are unmistakable.

The time and access symbology of the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command program is quite clear. The

Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command has direct and continuous access to the Commanding Officer. He can get command attention on any situation or problem. The Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command is the only member of the command other than the Commanding Officer that has a formal and legitimate communication link outside the command.

The physical space symbology of the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command program is equally as clear as that of time and access, especially in SURFLANT. Aboard naval ships, there is almost no commodity as valuable as space. Department heads fight over every square foot. Many department heads do not have offices and virtually every division officer works out of his stateroom. All of this notwithstanding, the instruction directs the Commanding Officer to provide office space where physically feasible.

3. Symbolic Human Resources

The symbology of the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command program is extremely important in the human resource perspective. The mere existence of the program makes very important symbolic statements:

1. The U. S. Navy recognizes the critical importance of the enlisted men and women who serve therein.
2. The Navy acknowledges individuals' needs and demonstrates its interest in meeting those needs.

Each of these statements is a worthy idea and serves an important purpose. The fact that the program does make these two symbolic statements is sufficient justification to guarantee the program in some form. Are there other symbolic statements made by the program's existence? The author feels that there are and will highlight these in the next chapter. For now, however, it is important to at least

note that any program which involves people, makes some type of symbolic statement about the organization's attitudes towards people. Programs typically imply a level of trust or distrust, care or lack of care, prioritization, and many other value judgements which the organization has made, either consciously or unconsciously.

V. HUMAN RESOURCE PERSPECTIVE

In the United States, management has turned to the behavior sciences and motivation theorists to expand their ability to maximize the productivity of the human resources used in organizations. The U. S. Navy has been no exception. Leadership training for naval officers has included review of theories ranging from Maslow's hierarchy to Whyte's participatory management. More than reviewing theories, the Navy has taken active steps to improve the situation of the human assets which make-up the Navy. The steps have included increased attention to pay incentives, more attention to the needs of the serviceman's family, better health care, more attention to habitability both ashore and afloat, and other "people" oriented improvements too numerous to mention. While the efforts to improve the situation for Navymen have been on going for many decades, the necessity to increase managerial attention escalated significantly during the Viet Nam era. Liberal legislation and judicial rulings, the popularization of anti-American, anti-military attitudes, the rapid sophistication of warfare technology, and the increased educational level of recruits and the general population made the task of the military a much more challenging job. As Viet Nam came to a close, the Navy faced numerous manpower problems. The increased anti-establishment attitude of the younger recruits, the feverish racial issues of the day, and the impending threat of the "All Volunteer Force", demonstrated the need to do something to improve the situation. Admiral Zumwalt made dynamic efforts in the human resource area. He tasked his

subordinates to exercise the very best leadership to encourage personnel to support the Navy. He took organizational steps to ensure institutional discrimination was erased. He initiated programs designed to prevent drug abuse from undermining the human resources of the Navy. Admiral Zumwalt knew that he could not fix the situation by himself so he solicited assistance for subordinate officers and enlisted personnel. Two of the organizational changes that came from his efforts were: the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command program and the Human Resources Management program. Both were charged with the same task: help improve the fit between the needs of the U. S. Navy and the needs of the individual serviceman.

A. HUMAN RESOURCE THEORIES

To mention even the important theories in human resource management is a significant task. Most managers today recognize at least a dozen or so "prominent" theorists including Maslow, McGregor, Weber, Herzberg, Vroom, Blake, Mouton, French, Raven, Peters, Argyris, Likert and many, many more. For this reason, the author has chosen to discuss the final perspective in terms of approaches to individual motivation and general patterns of managerial approaches to motivation. While this may be a somewhat limited focus, the approaches and patterns will reflect many of the theories espoused by those listed above. Before moving into the discussion it is important to note that motivation is not the only factor in obtaining organizational needs from individuals. Each individual adds to organizational objectives based on motivation, ability, and role perception. If any one of these factors is low, the overall contribution of an individual will tend to be low. For example, even if a quarterback is highly motivated and

can throw a football farther and with more accuracy than any other quarterback in the league, he will not contribute to the overall team performance if he does not understand that he is to

1. throw the ball only to his team-mates,
2. call different types of plays to confuse the opponents
3. stay behind the blockers for protection, etc.

Other words, if the quarterback does not understand his role or job.

[Ref. 6]

1. Approaches

The Content approach to motivation stresses the importance of the factors within individuals. These factors will cause individuals to act in certain ways. In other words, people will take a course of action to fulfill a need which is self-imposed. The best known of the content theories is Maslow's "Hierarchy of Needs" in which human needs are categorized into five levels: physiological, security, social, esteem, and self-actualization.

The process approach to motivation stresses the importance of applied factors. Rewards and punishment can induce certain behavior from individuals independently of what their needs may have been prior to the application of the outside factors. The extent to which the individual believes that an action on his part will result in a reaction, and the degree to which he wants that reaction to occur will determine his motivation to participate in the action.

Operant conditioning is a subset of the process approach. As in the process approach, operant conditioning theories state that motivation is affected by outside

factors. However, operant conditioning suggests that motivation for the future will be based on consequences of the past. This line of thought suggests that individuals will choose those activities which in the past, lead to favorable results.

2. Models

As noted at the beginning of the chapter, managers have had to deal with changing employee attitudes, abilities, and requirements. The following three models are indicative of the attitudes and operating procedures with which management may be approaching organization personnel considerations. [Ref. 20]

According to the traditional model, the task of the manager is to ensure that the workers perform their work despite its unpleasantness and their lack of interest in it. The only effective way to motivate workers is to provide sufficient monetary rewards to "buy" the use of their energies. This model also relies heavily on the use of close supervision and specific task assignment. The basis of the traditional model of motivation is to influence employees to accept the work demands placed upon them by management. Employees are motivated to do as they are told.

In the human relations model, managers recognize that employees can be motivated by factors other than money. The importance of the social/interpersonal relationships at the work place are acknowledged. The human relations model assumes that people want to feel important and productive, and to be recognized as individuals. Management's main task is to make each employee feel useful and important. He should communicate with subordinates and listen to their objections or complaints. Management should allow some self-direction on routine work to accommodate the workers' need to feel useful. If management is successful with

communications and allowing some self-direction he can expect the employees to be more satisfied and cooperative. This increased cooperation will allow the organization to increase efficiency and production.

The human resources model calls for managers to recognize that employees may very well obtain as much satisfaction from their jobs as the boss does from his. Work is not inherently bad. Employees want to be a part of a worthwhile organization and will willingly give time and effort to goals in which they believe. Management should encourage as much self-direction as coordination and abilities allow. The managers' main task is to make the maximum use of the potential of every individual by removing unnecessary restraints and organizational obstacles which block self-actualization and hamper self-esteem. The manager who successfully employs the human resource model can expect his subordinates to be highly satisfied as a result of the organization's and individual's improved efficiency and production. [Ref. 20]

B. HUMAN RESOURCES AND THE MASTER CHIEF PETTY OFFICER OF THE COMMAND PROGRAM

The correlation between the motivation theories and Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command program may seem elusive but the author believes that the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command program is indicative of the basic precepts of human value and human resource management. In keeping with the format of earlier chapters, the human resource perspective of the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command program will be discussed in five sections of "interest" groups.

1. Commanding Officer and Executive Officer

The function of the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command is to advise the Commanding Officer on the "Formulation and implementation of policies concerning morale, welfare, job satisfaction, discipline, utilization, and training of Navy's men and women." This implies that the Commanding Officer wants to be kept informed of matters that affect the enlisted personnel so that he can correct any wrongs, resolve any inconsistencies, or decide on other appropriate actions to improve morale so that he can build a cohesive working team that is willing to tackle shipboard problems. The Commanding Officer is willing to give up the obvious talent of the Master Chief in his "in-rate" billet in order to facilitate the supervision of the care and well-being of the enlisted personnel. The Commanding Officer is also apparently not willing to have his chain of command use their time in attending to these matters. Also, while the Commanding Officer indicates that he has the capability to resolve personnel matters, when advised of them, he is simultaneously implying that these problems can not be resolved at lower levels. By using the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command as a conduit, the Commanding Officer implies that the individual sailors are not capable of exercising appropriate self-assertiveness and self-responsibility to resolve problems in their own behalf. The Commanding Officer does not have a "Command Ensign" to facilitate the problems of the "ensign community". Why? The "ensign community" is expected to have enough maturity and self-determination to represent themselves in matters of personal concern. Why not the enlisted community?

The Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command program places the Commanding Officer squarely in the pattern of the human relations model of management. The

Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command is a tool to assist the Commanding Officer in seeing to the needs of the enlisted community so that they will be cooperative with the formal authority of the chain of command. The Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command represents the Commanding Officer's (and Navy's) paternalistic attitude towards the enlisted community.

2. Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command

A Navy Master Chief has served in the Navy for twenty-plus years. He has demonstrated the highest level of technical competence and significant ability to manage a workcenter, a division, and maybe a department. Is the Master Chief capable of exercising even more creative, responsible self-direction and self-control than this present in-rate job demands? If he is, what should the Navy do to "untap" his additional potential? The human resource model suggests that the manager's basic task is to make use of the "untapped" resources. The human relations model suggests that management should make him feel useful and important and enable him to exercise self-control on routine matters.

The human resource model suggests that the Master Chief should continue to broaden his self-direction and self-control. If the Master Chief has successfully run a workcenter for a long period and is obviously capable of further contributions, why not make him a division officer? Allow the Master Chief to be more creative than he has been in the past. If the Master Chief has run a division for several years, why not let him run the department if he has the capability? There are numerous ways to expand the self-determination and self-control of the Master Chief. The Master Chief could become a Limited Duty Officer to facilitate even broader expansion.

The human relations model suggests that the Master Chief should be made to "feel" more useful and more important. He should be informed and able to voice objections. The Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command program goes to great length to demonstrate the "importance" of the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command. However, the Master Chief's self direction and control have not been broadened. He is not "responsible" for any more resources or given discretionary license on fiscal matters. The Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command is allowed to communicate at a higher level of management. The Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command is used by the Commanding Officer as a symbolic statement of Commanding Officer concern for the enlisted community but that does not require the Master Chief to fully use his resources or potential. Indeed, much of the activity surrounding the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command program reduces him to a lackey. The Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command program uses the Master Chief to address the issue of enlisted usefulness and importance.

3. Chief Petty Officers

The effect on the Chief Petty Officer community is very similar to that of the remainder of the enlisted community so the author will attempt only to highlight special considerations in this section. The Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command program does not increase the creative, responsible self-direction and control of the Chief Petty Officers. It does provide the Chief Petty Officers with an alternative communication route to the Commanding Officer which can be utilized when the Chief Petty Officer finds the chain of command unresponsive to his (or his division's) needs. The Chiefs have an organizational structure in place to meet their needs. As mentioned

in the Cc discussion, this may very well imply a statement that the Chief is not capable of controlling his own fate unless an organizational support system is in place.

4. Enlisted Personnel

The origins of the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command program evolved from a concern for the enlisted community. Was that concern based in the human resources model or in the human relations model? Was Admiral Zumwalt attempting to encourage the enlisted community's willing cooperation by recognizing their usefulness and importance or was he trying to encourage them to exercise more creative, responsible self-direction and self-control than their jobs demanded? Does the sailor of today contribute more of his "untapped" resources or is he simply more willing to cooperate with management as a result of the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command program? Does the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command provide motivation? Do they feel important and useful?

The enlisted community's relation to the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command clearly indicates that the program is based on the assumptions of the human relations model. The Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command is not tasked to participate in the task assignments which determine the extent to which individual sailors can make use of their "untapped" resources. Division Chiefs and Officers provide the challenge of organizational objectives and determine how much self-direction and control each man can exercise. The Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command is involved with making people feel useful and important. The chain of command actually allows them to be useful and important.

5. Junior Officers

At first glance, it may seem somewhat strange to address the question of how the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command program affects the motivation of the junior officers, but junior officers want to feel useful and important and they want to contribute to the organization in a creative and responsible way. These are issues which involve the organization's attitudes toward human relations and human resources and since the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command program is a visible indication of the organizational attitude toward these issues, the junior officers are affected.

If the junior officer is regarded as a manager, his primary task is to make use of the human resources assigned to his responsibilities. In order for the junior officer to accomplish this, he must create an environment in which all members contribute their best efforts. He can accomplish this encouraging full participation in important matters, creating good communications, and assisting the individuals to exercise their potential in a relatively low-risk environment. The junior officer must demonstrate his recognition of their independence as human beings and his willingness to work with them on a one-to-one basis. With the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command program highlighting a difference between the officer and enlisted community, not just in billet description, but in a tone of "us vs them", the junior officer will find the establishment of the relationship more difficult.

The junior officer may interpret the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command program in the manner referred to in the discussion on delegation. The Commanding Officer expresses doubt that the chain of command will correctly see to the enlisted matters. He, therefore, has a "supervisor"

overlooking the execution of personnel matters. The Commanding Officer is not willing to allow the junior officer to exercise self-control in the area of enlisted personnel matters.

VI. SUMMARY

A. CONCLUSIONS

In the proceeding four chapters the author has presented a critical analysis of the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command program as it affects the organization from four perspectives or frames.

In the structural perspective, the author demonstrated how the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command program, in effect recentralized routine personnel matters from the lower and mid-level managers of the chain of command to the Commanding Officer and Executive Officer. The program also had the effect of changing the organization (in degree) from a divisional structure to a functional structure. As an example, the author argued that divisional structure requires that management have control of and responsibility for all assets used in attaining organizational goals, but that the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command effectively became the functional manager for enlisted personnel matters. In a closely related argument, the author demonstrated that the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command program had the effect of organizationally resolving the "dual leadership" conflict inherent in many decisions which managers must make. The Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command provides for the social or people-oriented requirements of the organization while the traditional chain of command provides for the task requirements.

In the political perspective, the importance of managerial power was discussed. The sources of basis of power were listed and discussed. The author evaluated the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command program's impact on five interest groups' power.

Commanding Officers appear to broaden their power base through alliance with Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command, and increased reward activity independent of the chain of command. The Commanding Officer's position as the crew's "representative" is enhanced because the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command demonstrates that the Commanding Officer is "in touch" with the crew. The Commanding Officer gains additional power by having access to additional decision premises through the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command line of communications. Finally, the Commanding Officer reduces his dependency on the traditional chain of command because he now has another avenue for the conduct of matters relating to the enlisted community.

The power shift in favor of the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command is the most significant political effect of the program. The Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command gains ability to influence others because of his alliance with the Commanding Officer. This alliance provides the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command with the ability to reward or punish, disseminate information (decision premises), and gain easy access to the Commanding Officer or Executive Officer.

The author demonstrated that the representative power enjoyed by the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command may be inappropriately bestowed. Results of the NAVSURFLANT survey revealed that the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command is more representative of, or has more in common with, the Commanding Officer than he does with junior enlisted personnel. The Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command's legitimate power base extends beyond the confines of the command via the squadron, group, and force master chief organization.

Chief Petty Officers gained power by having an "in-house" conduit to the Commanding Officer. The Chief Petty Officer dependence for information on the junior officers was reduced. The Chief Petty Officers have the ability to recommend rewards and punishments independent of the junior officers. The Chief Petty Officers even have the ability to threaten the junior officers with the use of their "alternative" communications route. While highlighting several areas in which the Chief Petty Officers are less dependent on the chain of command, the author also points out that they are now dependent in several ways on the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command. While their power basis has been broadened with junior officers, their power has been decreased in their relationship with the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command because of their increased dependency on him.

The author demonstrated that power basis of the enlisted personnel was essentially unchanged. The major advantage for the enlisted personnel below the rank of chief, is an increased access to decision premises. The author acknowledged an improved overall situation for the enlisted community but in terms of hygiene or relationship factors and not increased power to determine one's own usefulness within the organization.

Junior officers were described as the major "losers" of power as a result of the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command program. The Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command represents an alternative conduit for matters affecting individuals and the organization for the enlisted community. This availability reduces their dependence on the traditional chain of command. The junior officer's coercive power is reduced to the extent that his subordinates can use the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command communications link to convey their perception of the

"fairness" of the junior officers' withholding of rewards or use of punishment. Whether justified or not, the junior officer will be placed in a defensive position when inquiries start coming down the chain of command from the Commanding Officer.

The junior officer has lost some of his power base related to decision premises. The chiefs and other enlisted personnel can often obtain better and quicker information from the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command than from the chain of command. The author pointed out that it is not unusual for the junior officer to obtain information from the chief that the junior officer ought to be providing to the chief.

In the symbolic perspective, the author summarized several theories on symbology and demonstrated how symbolic activities, language, ceremonies and other aspects of the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command program can be interpreted as different "statements" about the power, structure, and human resource attitudes of the Commanding Officer and the Navy. The main focus of the discussion was on the difference between how the Navy "says" the program affects the chain of command and how the author "sees" the program affecting the command. The MCPOC pin, office space, access to the Commanding Officer all suggest that the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command has a significantly higher status than do the junior officers.

In the human resources perspective, the author demonstrates how the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command program effectively places the Navy in the business of human relations management rather than the preferred human resource management. The Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command serves the purpose of "caring" for the enlisted community which the author believes represents a paternalistic attitude. The author believes that under a true human

resource management organization, each and every manager would be aware of the potential of the individuals within his organization and that mutual respect would enable each mature individual (enlisted and officer) to supervise his own well-being. Thus, the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command program would not be necessary except under the most unusual circumstances.

E. RECOMMENDATIONS

The following recommendations are provided based on the results of the research as presented herein.

1. The Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command program should continue to be a viable line of communications for extraordinary circumstances where the chain of command might not adequately support the best interests of the Navy's enlisted community.
2. Commanding Officers and Executive Officers should be advised of the possible negative aspects of the program on the various interest groups. In particular, the " Official " position as stated in OPNAVINST 5400.37C , that the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command works within the chain of command should be recognized as an idealistic statement and not indicative of the real structural impact of the program. As long as the Commanding Officers and other senior officers are willing to recognize and adjust for this aspect of the program, the likelihood of significant organizational problems resulting will be significantly reduced.
3. The Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command should be a collateral duty in all except the largest units (complement of 1000 or more). This will guarantee that the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command

does not become too distant from the junior enlisted personnel to lose touch with the day-to-day considerations and concerns of this group. The collateral duty Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command should not represent the same threat to the chain of command that the full time Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command does. The chain of command will not feel that a second chain is "waiting in the wings" for the opportunity to challenge the chain of command.

4. The necessity to balance the needs of the service with the needs of the individual service members should be re-emphasized as the primary task of the managers of the Navy at all levels. This task is not to be left to the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command or the Commanding Officer. It should occur at the leading petty officer, chief petty officer, and junior officer levels as well as at the Commanding Officer and Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command level. It is the author's belief that this is the real issue involved with the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command program and that the only way the Navy is going to make maximum use of the human resources available is to have the managers address the issue everyday in every decision. The Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command program does not force the chain of command to face this issue; instead it allows the chain of command to pass ownership of the problem to a special staff "action officer".
5. The practice of having the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command participate in the ceremonies of the command should be significantly reduced. This practice is particularly dangerous when the ceremony involves the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command participating in ceremonies with the

Commanding Officer or other senior officials. The power implications are obvious and potentially disastrous. The most important of these ceremonies are those which involve direct participation of the chain of command. Inspections make an excellent example in that the chain of command is presenting their spaces or personnel in order to be evaluated by seniors. If the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command is a key participant in the event, the chain of command participants lose the focus of responsibility and authority.

6. While not directly related to the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command program or this study, the author believes that the survey results point to a significant problem which should be investigated. The junior officer community as depicted by the survey results is the least positive of any of the groups evaluated. While the author does not presume to imply that this situation is a direct result of the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command program, the author does feel that the program may be one contributor to an overall problem area which can not be ignored without significant consequences. The author recommends that a review of the policies and attitudes toward the junior officer community in SURFLANT be initiated.
7. The final recommendation is a direct result of the interviews with Commanding Officers and other senior officers. The majority of the Commanding Officers expressed the desire to select their own Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command. They almost unanimously believed that the success of the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command would be determined to a large degree by the personal relationship between the

Commanding Officer and Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command. The Commanding Officers felt that they could best decide who and in what billet the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command could serve the best interests of the command.

APPENDIX A

EXCERPT FROM CFNAVINST 5400.37C

SECTION C - AUTHORITY AND RESPONSIBILITIES .

1. As senior enlisted advisor to the commander/commanding officer on all matters relating to enlisted policy, the Fleet, Force, and Command Master Chiefs must work with the executive officer, chief of staff, or deputy in the dissemination and promotion of command policy. He or she will function as an integral element of chain of command.

2. Authority and Responsibility. Extent of role and ultimate assignment of responsibilities and authority of Fleet, Force, and Command Master Chiefs will be determined by the commander/commanding officer based on needs of the command. In general, the following responsibilities will be included.

a. Maintain and promote effectiveness and efficiency of chain of command.

b. Assist commander/commanding officer in all matters pertaining to welfare, health, job satisfaction, morale, utilization, and training of enlisted personnel in order to promote traditional standards of good order and discipline.

c. Advises commander/commanding officer on formulation and implementation of changes in policy pertaining to enlisted members.

d. Attend meetings as directed by commander/commanding officer to keep apprised of current issues and provide a representative enlisted input.

e. Participate in ceremonies honoring command members.

f. When appropriate, represent or accompany commander/commanding officer to official functions, inspections, and conferences.

g. Participate in reception and hosting of official visitors to the command.

h. Upon invitation and as approved by commander/commanding officer, represent the command and Navy at community and civic functions.

i. Participate in, coordinate, or monitor the following, as appropriate.

- (1) Command Orientation/Indoctrination
- (2) CPO/PO Indoctrination Courses
- (3) Enlisted Warfare Qualification Program
- (4) Professional Development Board
- (5) Command Retention Team
- (6) Awards Board (when enlisted personnel are being considered)
- (7) Sailor of the Month/Quarter/Year Selection Boards
- (8) Human Resources Management Program
- (9) Family Services Programs; e.g., Ombudsman, Family Services Centers
- (10) Unaccompanied Enlisted Personnel Housing Management Program
- (11) Habitability Afloat Program
- (12) Commissary and Navy Exchange Advisory Boards (Ashore)
- (13) General Mess and Ship's Store Advisory Boards (Afloat)
- (14) Humanitarian Reassignment/Hardship Discharge Screening Boards
- (15) Command Examining Boards
- (16) Recreation Advisory Boards

3. The following F M/C's, assigned as members of the Chief of Naval Operations' Master Chief Petty Officer Advisory Panel, will meet when directed by CNO. The Master Chief Petty Officer of the Navy will chair the Advisory Panel.

Master Chief Petty Officer of the Navy (Chairman)

Fleet Master Chiefs from:

CINCPACFLT

CINCLANTFLT

CINCUSNAVEUR

NAVSHORE (AVCNO/DNA)

CNET

CHNAVMAT

FORCE Master Chiefs from:

CCMNAVSURFPAC

CCMNAVSURFLANT

CCMNAVAIRPAC

CCMNAVAIRLANT

CCMNAVSUEPAC

CCMNAVSUELANT

CCMNAVMEDCOM

CNAVRES

4. Precedence:

a. Fleet Master Chiefs shall take precedence over all other enlisted members of U.S. Navy except Master Chief Petty Officer of the Navy.

b. Force Master Chiefs shall take precedence over all other enlisted members of U.S. Navy except Master Chief Petty Officer of the Navy and Fleet Master Chiefs.

c. Command Master Chief takes precedence over all other enlisted members within a command.

APPENDIX B
INTERVIEWS

Captain, Squadron Commander

The Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command program is a significant step in the right direction. I think it should be expanded. Master Chief Petty Officer of the Commands should be advanced to an "E-10" rate, given extra privileges, more pay, and more recognition. The program helps to get the Master Chiefs back to sea where they are needed. It helps keep them in the Navy when they otherwise would have retired. The Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command aboard my last command provided me with the pulse of the ship and served as a sounding board for my ideas. He ran the Chief's Mess in every sense of the word. The Chiefs knew that he spoke for me. The Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command ran NJP review, PO indoctrination, junior officer training, awards, retention, and the Welcome Aboard program, and much more. I gave him an officer's stateroom. We can not do enough for these guys.

Captain, Squadron Commander

The Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command serves as an additional conduit for the enlisted personnel. The program is as good as the relationship between the Commanding Officer and the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command. The Commanding Officer should have the flexibility to choose who he wants to be the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command. It shouldn't necessarily be determined strictly by seniority. He can be used to handle programs which affect the enlisted personnel but are not really the responsibility of a particular department, for example, the Enlisted Surface Warfare Specialist program and I-division. There could be some resentment by the chain of command if the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command gets "into their knickers" but that shouldn't happen if the Commanding Officer sets the right tone. The Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command should be assigned on a collateral-duty basis. A Master Chief has too much expertise in his rate to simply ignore that aspect. If the program were cancelled today, I don't think anything would change aboard good ships. The Commanding Officer would still talk to "the best" chief on board to try to keep in touch with the enlisted perspective.

Lieutenant, LDO, (18 years service)

The Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command is just one of many of the "touchy-feely" programs which the Navy has tried to use instead of returning to the basics. Most of these programs shouldn't be there or should be significantly scaled down. I was brought up with the basics. By that, I mean the basics of leadership. My Chief kicked me in the butt when I wasn't doing my job. He also went nose-to-nose with my division officer to get my leave approved when I deserved it. He did not do it because he was aware of my needs or because he was worried about retention. He did what he did because he wanted to do a good job as the chief and because he was absolutely fair. Giving people titles and phoney responsibilities doesn't do anything except waste manpower. The best thing that the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command program does is that it tells people that the Commanding Officer is, at least officially, interested in their problems. But, that really doesn't "do" anything for people. If the Commanding Officer really wants to "do" something for his troops, he tells the Executive Officer and somewhere down the line (chain of command) some petty officer tells some seaman to paint the berthing space or fix the plumbing. In a majority of the cases I've seen, the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command doesn't do anything for the crew. Within three months of a Commanding Officer's arrival, the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command will be doing whatever the Commanding Officer wants, not necessarily what the enlisted community needs. The Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command becomes a "yes man". At least if a Master Chief is running a division, he can tell the Commanding Officer what's really happening and then retreat to his workcenter. If the Commanding Officer really cares about the troops, he'll tell that Master Chief

to turn-to instead of putting all the work on the good chiefs that are being driven into the dirt.

Chief Warrant Officer, (18 years)

The Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command is one of the best things to happen since I've been in the Navy. The Captain can get the story on what's really happening without all the filters or blocks that usually get in the way. I think the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command can make the difference between having a good ship and a great ship. If he works with the chain of command he will be listened to and respected. The junior officers especially can get good recommendations and guidance if they are willing to listen. If the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command isn't the type that puts the division officers on report to the Commanding Officer/Executive Officer, he can really make a difference. The Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command we have is a terrific chief and a great technician. I think he gains a lot of respect because he is still doing his in-rate work even though the Captain wants to make him a full time Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command. Of course, he's so good that his division runs great even when he's busy with command business. That helps here but on other ships the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command might have to be full time in order to be effective at either job.

Captain, Squadron Commander

The major task of the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command is to be the president of the CPO Mess. He can really help the Commanding Officer/Executive Officer keep those guys integrally involved in running the ship. If he can keep the Chiefs working with the Captain instead of against him, the ship will be a superstar in every respect. The Chiefs will keep the troops busy and happy and free the officers to keep up on the paperwork and warfare aspects. The success of the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command is going to be dependent a great deal on his personality and the personality of the Commanding Officer/Executive Officer. The Commanding Officer has to have someone with whom he can work. The most senior chief may not be the best man to fill the billet. The Commanding Officer should have the flexibility to pick and choose. The major attribute which the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command ought to have is some ability as a facilitator. If he has this ability, he can communicate the problems he hears from the troops and the policy or explanation he receives from the Commanding Officer without challenging the Captain's authority or siding with the establishment in the eyes of the crew.

Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command,
(collateral duty)

I think the program has been a real success. The standards have really improved in areas like habitability and recreation and I think the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command program has played an important part in it. The recent emphasis to get the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command more visibility is good. It shows the troops that the enlisted community is an important part of the Navy and that the Commanding Officer recognizes that fact. It is very important that the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command work within the chain of command. If he is always running to the Executive Officer to tell on this division officer or department head, or even another chief, the word is going to get around and people will steer clear of him. I try to go to the lowest level I can to resolve problems. I usually start with the Leading Petty Officer but sometimes it's a matter of getting two seamen to talk to each other. The chiefs decided to make a real effort to get the petty officers to carry more of the load around here. As President of the CPO Mess, I discussed it with the Commanding Officer and got his approval on the idea. The officers were behind us, too, especially since the Commanding Officer wanted them to be behind us. I'm not saying that we back-dcored them either. The officers would have wanted to support us anyway but knowing that the Commanding Officer was not going to come down on them if something fell through the cracks made it a little easier for them to take the risk of letting the Petty officers take on more responsibilities. This happened about four months ago and I think we've got some young petty officers who are

better qualified and more productive than a lot of chiefs on other ships. It happened because everyone supported the idea. The Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command has real potential. I'd like to see it work this well everywhere.

Captain, Commanding Officer

The idea behind the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command program is good. I think it evolved from the Senior Enlisted Advisor program of the early 1970's. We really needed it back then because of the Viet Nam stuff, the problems with race relations, and the general unrest in the junior enlisted ranks. I truthfully think the reason the program is getting so big is because we're using it as a "carrot" to entice these guys to go back to sea. I don't have anything to base that on; it's just a gut feeling. The thing I like about the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command program is that it is another tool for the Commanding Officer to use to help run his ship. If everything is running smooth, then the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command can stay down in the holes (or wherever) and take care of his division responsibilities. If there's a problem somewhere that he can provide some information on, the Captain can call him up or he can just come in and see me. He has an open-door policy with me. I use him as a sounding board. He's been around a long time and he's seen lots of CO's make mistakes so maybe he can keep me from tripping over my sword. The Commanding Officer should have the flexibility to choose someone besides the most senior chief. The guy who is most senior may not have the personality to be a good Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command or he may be too loaded down with division responsibilities. I think the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command should be a collateral duty except maybe on an aircraft carrier or LHA. It's a nice asset but only as an extra benefit. I don't think I'd want one on a full time basis. If you asked any Commanding Officer if he'd rather spend his optar to pay for a full time Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command or

save the optar and assign his own collateral duty Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command, I think they'd all pick the collateral duties. Of course, if Washington is giving away Master Chiefs, no ones going to turn them down. If nothing else, the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command can take some of the load off the Executive Officer in the routine personnel program areas.

APPENDIX C
SURVEY OF COMNAVSURFLANT PERSONNEL

THE PURPOSE OF THIS SURVEY IS TO GAIN AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE NORMAL MANNER OF CONDUCTING BUSINESS ABOARD YOUR SHIP AND YOUR GENERAL ATTITUDE REGARDING THE NORMS. YOUR ANSWERS ARE ABSOLUTELY CONFIDENTIAL. THE COMPILED DATA FROM ABOUT 30 COMMANDS WILL BE PRESENTED TO COMNAVSURFLANT AND SUPERINTENDENT, NAVPGSCHOOL AS A PORTION OF MY THESIS WORK. YOUR COOPERATION AND ASSISTANCE ARE GREATLY APPRECIATED.

PLEASE FILL IN THE BLANKS OR CIRCLE THE MULTIPLE-CHOICE ANSWER WHERE APPROPRIATE.

ALL HANDS

1. What is your present rank/rate?_____

2. Which category best describes your present billet?
 - a. CC/CDR
 - b. XC/CSU
 - c. Department Head
 - d. Division Officer
 - e. Division Chief
 - f. Command Chief
 - g. Petty Officer
 - h. E1-E3

3. How many years have you been on active duty in the
USN? _____

4. How many years have you spent aboard SURFLANT
Commands? _____

5. Not including your present command, to how many
SURFLANT commands have you been assigned? _____

6. While considering the merits of a Captain's Mast (NJP),
which person do you feel would best be able to influence
the Captain's opinion of the sailor in question?

- a. Division Chief
- b. Division LPO
- c. Chaplain
- d. Command Chief
- e. Department Head

7. If a junior enlisted man experienced racial/ethnic discrimination from his division chief and wanted to prevent further discrimination without causing future repercussions/animosities, to whom would he most likely initially report the incident?
- a. Division Chief
 - b. Division IPO
 - c. Command Chief
 - d. Chaplain
 - e. Department Head
8. If you were the Executive Officer of a ship and wanted to obtain a feel for the probable reaction of the crew regarding a possible policy change, from whom would you most likely seek advice?
- a. A department Head
 - b. A leading petty officer
 - c. Command Chief
 - d. A division CPC
 - e. Chaplain
9. Which of the following individuals in your opinion is most likely to understand the values, social pressures, and social norms of the new recruits entering today's Navy?
- a. Executive Officer
 - b. Division Chief
 - c. Leading Petty Officer
 - d. Division Officer
 - e. Command Chief

10. If a Task Force Commander (Rear Admiral/Commodore) came aboard your ship and asked to receive four briefs regarding the status of your ship, who could best provide the required information? (Circle four)
- a. Operations Officer
 - b. XO
 - c. CIC Officer
 - d. Command Chief
 - e. CC
 - f. Weapons Officer
 - g. 3M Coordinator
 - h. Chief Engineer
11. During routine inport operations at what time of day (on a 24 hour clock) do you usually arrive on board?
12. During routine inport operations at what time of day (on a 24 hour clock) do you usually depart the ship for the day?
13. In how many sections are you personally standing duty?
- a. Three or less
 - b. Four
 - c. Five
 - d. Six or more
 - e. I am not assigned to stand duty days.

14. Which of the personnel listed below, if any, do you feel should not be required to stand duty? (Circle each category that you feel should be exempted)

- a. CO
- b. XO
- c. Senior Watch Officer
- d. Mess Cooks
- e. Chaplain
- f. Department Heads
- g. 3M Coordinator
- h. Warrant Officers
- i. Surface Warfare Officers
- j. Chief Petty Officers
- k. Command Chief
- l. Supply Corps Officers
- m. Ship's Secretary

15. To what extent are appropriate and reasonable privileges commensurate with responsibility and position granted to the Chief Petty Officers of this command?

- a. Significantly insufficient privileges are granted
- b. Somewhat insufficient privileges are granted
- c. Privileges are appropriate and reasonable
- d. Somewhat excessive privileges are granted
- e. Significantly excessive privileges are granted

16. To what extent are appropriate and reasonable privileges commensurate with responsibility and position granted to the junior officers of this command?
- a. Significantly insufficient privileges are granted
 - b. Somewhat insufficient privileges are granted
 - c. Privileges are appropriate and reasonable
 - d. Somewhat excessive privileges are granted
 - e. Significantly excessive privileges are granted
17. To what extent are appropriate and reasonable privileges, commensurate with responsibilities and position, granted to the Command Chief of this command?
- a. Significantly insufficient privileges are granted
 - b. Somewhat insufficient privileges are granted
 - c. Privileges are appropriate and reasonable
 - d. Somewhat excessive privileges are granted
 - e. Significantly excessive privileges are granted
18. To what extent is earning a battle efficiency "E" important to you?
- a. To a very great extent
 - b. To a great extent
 - c. To somewhat of an extent
 - d. To a small extent
 - e. To a very small extent

19. To what extent do you feel that the job you are performing is worthwhile?

- a. To a very great extent
- b. To a great extent
- c. To somewhat of an extent
- d. To a small extent
- e. To a very small extent

20. On the average, to what extent do you enjoy coming to work in the morning?

- a. To a very great extent
- b. To a great extent
- c. To somewhat of an extent
- d. To a small extent
- e. To a very small extent

21. On the average, to what extent do you feel that your time is used productively during the working day?

- a. To a very great extent
- b. To a great extent
- c. To somewhat of an extent
- d. To a small extent
- e. To a very small extent

22. On the average, to what extent do your superiors enforce the use of the chain of command?

- a. To a very great extent
- b. To a great extent
- c. To somewhat of an extent
- d. To a small extent
- e. To a very small extent

23. On the average, to what extent is your chain of command willing to take action on known or alleged racial or ethnic issues?

- a. To a very great extent
- b. To a great extent
- c. To somewhat of an extent
- d. To a small extent
- e. To a very small extent

OFFICERS AND CHIEF PETTY OFFICERS PLEASE CONTINUE ON NEXT PAGE. ALL OTHERS PLEASE STOP AND RETURN THE QUESTIONNAIRE TO THE PROCTOR. THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME AND COOPERATION.

CPO/OFFICERS

24. During a normal inport work-week, on the average how many hours do you spend talking with the Executive Officer on a one to one basis? _____
25. How do you feel about the amount of time you spend with the Executive Officer?
- a. Consider it to be very insufficient
 - b. Consider it to be somewhat insufficient
 - c. Consider it to be appropriate
 - d. Consider it to be somewhat excessive
 - e. Consider it to be very excessive
26. During a normal inport work-week, on the average how many hours do you spend talking with the Captain on a one to one basis? _____

27. How do you feel about the amount of time you spend with the Captain?

- A. Consider it to be very insufficient
- B. Consider it to be somewhat insufficient
- C. Consider it to be appropriate
- D. Consider it to be somewhat excessive
- E. Consider it to be very excessive

28. Which of the following best describes the tone of your relationship with the Captain? (If none applies, please choose the answer which is least inaccurate.)

- a. Businesslike based on mutual respect
- b. Friendly and positive
- c. He uses me to implement his policies
- d. He does not appreciate my ability and potential
- e. He shows interest in my well-being only to the extent that he feels he must.

29. Which of the following best describes the tone of your relationship with the Executive Officer? (If none applies, please choose the answer which is the least inaccurate.)

- a. Businesslike based on mutual respect
- b. Friendly and positive
- c. He uses me to implement his policies
- d. He does not appreciate my ability and potential
- e. He shows interest in my well-being only to the extent that he feels he must

30. Which of the following best describes the dominant motivation which persuaded you to join the Navy?
- a. I saw an opportunity to obtain training and education which otherwise would not have been available to me.
 - b. I saw an opportunity to travel and be "on my own".
 - c. I wanted to serve my country
 - d. I saw an opportunity to become a leader with significant responsibility at an early age.
 - e. I saw an opportunity to earn a reasonable income with security and I did not have any better options at the time.
31. To what extent do you feel that the word received in the CPD mess is more accurate than the word received via the chain of command?
- a. To a very great extent
 - b. To a great extent
 - c. To some extent
 - d. To a little extent
 - e. To a very little extent
32. To what extent have you been given the opportunity to learn and demonstrate management and leadership commensurate with your ability?
- a. To a very great extent
 - b. To a great extent
 - c. To some extent
 - d. To a little extent
 - e. To a very little extent

33. To what extent is the management/leadership aspect of your job more important to you than the warfare/technical aspect?
- a. To a very great extent
 - b. To a great extent
 - c. To some extent
 - d. To a little extent
 - e. To a very little extent
34. To what extent does your job performance reflect your maximum capability?
- a. To a very great extent
 - b. To a great extent
 - c. To some extent
 - d. To a little extent
 - e. To a very little extent
35. To what extent are your special achievements or extra efforts recognized by the CO?
- a. To a very great extent
 - b. To a great extent
 - c. To some extent
 - d. To a little extent
 - e. To a very little extent

36. To what extent have you been given the authority and responsibility commensurate with your billet?

- a. To a very great extent
- b. To a great extent
- c. To some extent
- d. To a little extent
- e. To a very little extent

37. To what extent are you confident that the CO would act on a worthwhile suggestion by you?

- a. To a very great extent
- b. To a great extent
- c. To some extent
- d. To a little extent
- e. To a very little extent

38. To what extent do you feel that the CO has an accurate understanding of your motivations?

- a. To a very great extent
- b. To a great extent
- c. To some extent
- d. To a little extent
- e. To a very little extent

39. To what extent do you feel that the CO has a genuine concern for your welfare?
- a. To a very great extent
 - b. To a great extent
 - c. To some extent
 - d. To a little extent
 - e. To a very little extent
40. To what extent do you feel that privileges in the Navy are granted appropriately?
- a. To a very great extent
 - b. To a great extent
 - c. To some extent
 - d. To a little extent
 - e. To a very little extent

41. To what extent do you agree with the practice of granting special privileges to personnel junior in rank to persons not granted these privileges (i.e. Sailor of the Quarter/CPO/MCPO reserved parking places at the Navy Exchange or pier parking lots, exemption from the watchbill, etc...)?

- a. Strongly agree with practice
- b. Agree with practice
- c. No opinion
- d. Disagree with practice
- e. Strongly disagree with practice

COMMAND MASTER/SENIOR/CHIEF PETTY OFFICERS PLEASE CONTINUE ON NEXT PAGE. ALL OTHERS PLEASE STOP AND RETURN QUESTIONNAIRE TO PROCTOR. THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME AND COOPERATION.

COMMAND CHIEF

42. To what extent did your formal schools prepare you for your present billet?
- a. To a very great extent
 - b. To a great extent
 - c. To some extent
 - d. To a little extent
 - e. To a very little extent
43. To whom (by billet, not name) are you directly responsible for the manner in which you perform your primary job?_____
44. Over the past four weeks, how many hours have you spent working/assisting in the area of your rate? (i.e. for a GMCM, how many hours working with missile systems or assisting your command's GM's?)
- a. None
 - b. One-half workday (4 hours) or less
 - c. Between one-half and a full workday
 - d. The equivalent of one to three workdays
 - e. More than the equivalent of three workdays

45. Thinking about your job when you were a division chief, how would you compare the relative satisfaction you received then as compared to the satisfaction you receive now?
- a. Significantly more satisfaction as a division chief
 - b. Somewhat more satisfaction as a division chief
 - c. No definable difference
 - d. Somewhat more satisfaction as Command Chief
 - e. Significantly more satisfaction as a Command Chief
46. Since becoming a Command Chief, have you ever been asked to represent the CO at any function away from the Command?
- a. Yes
 - b. No
47. Since becoming a Command Chief, have you ever discussed the leadership/management problems of a specific division officer or department head with the CO or XO?
- a. Yes
 - b. No
48. Since becoming a Command Chief, have you ever promulgated a command-wide policy announcement (i.e. change in the daily routine, procedures for mess cooks, etc...)?
- a. Yes
 - b. No

PLEASE RETURN THE QUESTIONNAIRE TO THE PROCTOR. THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME AND COOPERATION.

APPENDIX D
CCMNAVSURFLANT SURVEY AND INTERVIEW PARTICIPANTS

CCMCRUDESGRU TWO
CCMCRUDESGRU TWELVE
CCMSERVGRU TWO
CCMDESRCN TWO
CCMDESRCN EIGHT
CCMDESRCN TWELVE
CCMPHIBRON TWELVE

USS WAINWRIGHT (CG 28)
USS JOSEPHUS DANIELS (CG 27)
USS PREELE (DDG 46)
USS CONYINGHAM (DDG 17)
USS RICHARD E. BYRD (DDG 23)
USS KING (DDG 41)
USS SAMFSON (DDG 10)
USS THORN (DD 988)
USS MCCLOY (FF 1038)
USS THOMAS C. HART (FF 1092)
USS MOINESTER (FF 1097)
USS EDWARD MCDONNEL (FF 1043)
USS TRIFF (FF 1075)
USS JOESEPH HEWES (FF 1078)
USS RALIEGH (LPD 1)
USS IWO JIMA (LPH 2)
USS PORTLAND (LSD 37)
USS SPARTENBURG COUNTY (LST 1192)
USS YELLOWSTONE (AD 41)
USS SIERRA (AD 18)
USS SAN DIEGO (AFS 6)

APPENDIX E
RESULTS OF SURVEY

This appendix provides the results of the survey conducted aboard the SURFLANT ships and staffs listed in Appendix D. A total of 824 personnel participated in the survey. The results are listed by billet in columns. The breakdown in terms of total numbers is:

1. Commanding Officers/Commanders.....	12
2. Executive Officers/Chief Staff Officers.....	18
3. Department Heads.....	26
4. Division Officers.....	59
5. Division Chiefs.....	65
6. Master Chief Petty Officers of the Command...	15
7. Petty Officers.....	431
8. Seamen/Firemen.....	170

Each row represents the five choices of answers available for each question. Reading across each row will demonstrate the percent of each billet category who selected that answer. The double asteriks (**) indicate that the answer was not selected by anyone in that category (or zero percent).

6. While considering the merits of a Captain's Mast (NJP), which person do you feel would best be able to influence the Captain's opinion of the sailor in question?

- a. Division Chief
- b. Division LPO
- c. Chaplain
- d. Command Chief
- e. Department Head

	CO	XO	DH	DO	DC	MC	PO	SN
a. Division Chief	83	64	56	54	66	47	38	34
b. Division LPO	17	**	17	09	08	14	36	25
c. Chaplain	**	**	**	04	02	**	02	03
d. Command Chief	**	18	06	11	10	13	04	08
e. Department Head	**	18	22	23	14	27	20	29

QUESTION 6 RESULTS

7. If a junior enlisted man experienced racial/ethnic discrimination from his division chief and wanted to prevent further discrimination without causing future repercussions/animosities, to whom would he most likely initially report the incident?

- a. Division Chief
- b. Division LPO
- c. Command Chief
- d. Chaplain
- e. Department Head

	CO	XO	DH	DO	DC	MC	EO	SN
a. Division Chief	**	08	06	02	09	07	06	07
b. Division LPO	17	**	12	26	06	07	30	27
c. Command Chief	67	75	29	42	66	67	33	19
d. Chaplain	17	17	18	15	08	07	16	25
e. Department Head	**	**	35	16	11	13	16	22

QUESTION 7 RESULTS

8. If you were the Executive Officer of a ship and wanted to obtain a feel for the probable reaction of the crew regarding a possible policy change, from whom would you most likely seek advice?

- a. A department Head
- b. A leading petty officer
- c. Command Chief
- d. A division CPO
- e. Chaplain

	CO	XO	DH	DO	DC	MC	FO	SN
a. Department Head	**	08	05	02	05	**	03	13
b. LPC	**	**	10	14	06	**	41	29
c. Command Chief	100	92	75	71	71	93	40	40
d. Division CPC	**	**	10	14	15	07	16	16
e. Chaplain	**	**	**	**	03	**	**	02

QUESTION 8 RESULTS

9. Which of the following individuals in your opinion is most likely to understand the values, social pressures, and social norms of the new recruits entering today's Navy?

- a. Executive Officer
- b. Division Chief
- c. Leading Petty Officer
- d. Division Officer
- e. Command Chief

	CO	XO	DH	DO	LC	MC	PO	SN
a. Executive Off.	17	10	**	02	02	07	02	07
b. Division Chief	**	10	20	07	21	**	08	10
c. LPC	17	40	40	58	43	29	75	62
d. Division Off.	17	**	15	11	05	21	02	03
e. Command Chief	50	40	25	23	30	43	13	18

QUESTION 9 RESULTS

10. If a Task Force Commander (Rear Admiral/Commodore) came aboard your ship and asked to receive four briefs regarding the status of your ship, who could best provide the required information? (Circle four)

- a. Operations Officer
- b. XO
- c. CIC Officer
- d. Command Chief
- e. CO
- f. Weapons Officer
- g. 3M Coordinator
- h. Chief Engineer

	CO	XO	DH	DO	DC	MC	EO	SN
a. MCFOC	33	58	53	59	62	47	46	45
b. NCT MCPOC	67	42	47	41	38	53	54	55

QUESTION 10 RESULTS

13. In how many sections are you personally standing duty?

	CC	XO	DH	DO	LC	MC	FO	SN
a. Three or less	**	**	**	**	05	20	08	22
b. Four	17	08	25	72	68	07	68	60
c. Five	**	**	25	16	17	**	14	11
d. Six or more	**	**	35	11	05	**	05	05
e. No duty required	83	92	15	02	07	73	05	02

QUESTION 13 RESULTS

14. Which of the personnel listed below, if any, do you feel should not be required to stand duty? (Circle each category that you feel should be exempted)

- a. CO
- b. XO
- c. Senior Watch Officer
- d. Mess Cooks
- e. Chaplain
- f. Department Heads
- g. 3M Coordinator
- h. Warrant Officers
- i. Surface Warfare Officers
- j. Chief Petty Officers
- k. Command Chief
- l. Supply Corps Officers
- m. Ship's Secretary

	CO	XO	DH	DO	LC	MC	FO	SN
a. MCFOC should not	83	83	70	61	79	87	48	28
b. MCFOC should	17	17	30	39	21	13	52	72

QUESTION 14 RESULTS

15. To what extent are appropriate and reasonable privileges commensurate with responsibility and position granted to the Chief Petty Officers of this command?

- a. Significantly insufficient privileges are granted
- b. Somewhat insufficient privileges are granted
- c. Privileges are appropriate and reasonable
- d. Somewhat excessive privileges are granted
- e. Significantly excessive privileges are granted

	CO	XO	DH	DO	LC	MC	FO	SN
a. Significantly	**	**	**	09	13	13	05	03
b. Insufficient	17	**	05	15	33	20	15	11
c. Appropriate	83	92	85	66	55	60	62	57
d. Excessive	**	**	10	09	**	07	11	20
e. Significantly	**	**	**	02	**	**	06	08

QUESTION 15 RESULTS

16. To what extent are appropriate and reasonable privileges commensurate with responsibility and position granted to the junior officers of this command?

- a. Significantly insufficient privileges are granted
- b. Somewhat insufficient privileges are granted
- c. Privileges are appropriate and reasonable
- d. Somewhat excessive privileges are granted
- e. Significantly excessive privileges are granted

	CC	XO	DH	DO	DC	MC	PO	SN
a. Significantly	**	**	**	12	C9	07	03	04
b. Insufficient	**	25	30	32	13	07	12	16
c. Appropriate	100	75	65	48	59	67	57	57
d. Excessive	**	**	05	07	17	20	23	19
e. Significantly	**	**	**	02	02	**	06	05

QUESTION 16 RESULTS

17. To what extent are appropriate and reasonable privileges, commensurate with responsibilities and position, granted to the Command Chief of this command?

- a. Significantly insufficient privileges are granted
- b. Somewhat insufficient privileges are granted
- c. Privileges are appropriate and reasonable
- d. Somewhat excessive privileges are granted
- e. Significantly excessive privileges are granted

	CO	XO	DH	DO	DC	MC	PO	SN
a. Significantly	**	**	**	09	08	13	06	08
b. Insufficient	17	**	05	05	17	07	14	16
c. Appropriate	67	92	75	57	72	67	67	54
d. Excessive	17	08	10	21	02	13	08	12
e. Significantly	**	**	10	09	02	**	06	11

QUESTION 17 RESULTS

19. To what extent do you feel that the job you are performing is worthwhile?

- a. To a very great extent
- b. To a great extent
- c. To somewhat of an extent
- d. To a small extent
- e. To a very small extent

	CO	XO	DH	DO	DC	MC	FO	SN
a. Vy Great Extent	**	50	45	36	44	67	36	33
b. To Great Extent	34	50	25	32	28	20	28	25
c. Somewhat	66	**	30	24	17	13	22	22
d. To Small Extent	**	**	**	05	05	**	06	11
e. Vy Small Extent	**	**	**	03	06	**	08	11

QUESTION 19 RESULTS

20. On the average, to what extent do you enjoy coming to work in the morning?

- a. To a very great extent
- b. To a great extent
- c. To somewhat of an extent
- d. To a small extent
- e. To a very small extent

	CC	XO	DH	DO	DC	MC	PO	SN
a. VY Great Extent	100	75	68	48	52	67	40	25
b. To Great Extent	**	17	32	35	32	20	27	32
c. Somewhat	**	08	**	10	08	07	18	28
d. To Small Extent	**	**	**	03	05	07	07	09
e. VY Small Extent	**	**	**	03	03	**	08	06

QUESTION 20 RESULTS

21. On the average, to what extent do you feel that your time is used productively during the working day?

- a. To a very great extent
- b. To a great extent
- c. To somewhat of an extent
- d. To a small extent
- e. To a very small extent

	CO	XO	DH	DO	LC	MC	PO	SN
a. Vy Great Extent	67	58	20	14	11	33	04	04
b. To Great Extent	33	08	40	33	33	40	21	19
c. Somewhat	**	33	30	33	30	13	32	41
d. To Small Extent	**	**	10	12	11	13	24	17
e. Vy Small Extent	**	**	**	09	16	**	20	20

QUESTION 21 RESULTS

22. On the average, to what extent do your superiors enforce the use of the chain of command?

- a. To a very great extent
- b. To a great extent
- c. To somewhat of an extent
- d. To a small extent
- e. To a very small extent

	CO	XO	DH	DO	LC	MC	PO	SN
a. VY Great Extent	40	33	15	07	19	40	09	06
b. To Great Extent	60	25	45	42	33	33	30	24
c. Somewhat	**	33	30	31	24	13	31	41
d. To Small Extent	**	08	10	16	14	**	17	17
e. VY Small Extent	**	**	**	05	10	13	13	12

QUESTION 22 RESULTS

23. On the average, to what extent is your chain of command willing to take action on known or alleged racial/ethnic issues?

- a. To a very great extent
- b. To a great extent
- c. To somewhat of an extent
- d. To a small extent
- e. To a very small extent

	CO	XO	DH	DO	DC	MC	FO	SN
a. VY Great Extent	67	50	20	16	11	07	19	24
b. To Great Extent	33	42	55	38	19	47	38	41
c. Somewhat	**	08	15	28	47	27	25	21
d. To Small Extent	**	**	10	15	13	13	11	09
e. VY Small Extent	**	**	**	03	10	07	08	05

QUESTION 23 RESULTS

25. How do you feel about the amount of time you spend with the Executive Officer?

- a. Consider it to be very insufficient
- b. Consider it to be somewhat insufficient
- c. Consider it to be appropriate
- d. Consider it to be somewhat excessive
- e. Consider it to be very excessive

	CO	XO	DH	EO	DC	MC
a. Vy Insufficient	**	**	**	16	22	**
b. Insufficient	**	50	**	18	15	25
c. Appropriate	83	**	90	63	60	75
d. Excessive	17	**	05	02	02	**
e. Very Excessive	**	50	05	02	02	**

QUESTION 25 RESULTS

27. How do you feel about the amount of time you spend with the Captain?

- A. Consider it to be very insufficient
- B. Consider it to be somewhat insufficient
- C. Consider it to be appropriate
- D. Consider it to be somewhat excessive
- E. Consider it to be very excessive

	CO	XO	DH	DO	DC	MC
a. Vy Insufficient	**	**	**	09	15	08
b. Insufficient	**	**	**	26	14	25
c. Appropriate	100	92	100	64	70	67
d. Excessive	**	08	**	**	02	**
e. Very Excessive	**	**	**	02	**	**

QUESTION 27 RESULTS

28. Which of the following best describes the tone of your relationship with the Captain? (If none applies, please choose the answer which is least inaccurate.)

- a. Businesslike based on mutual respect
- b. Friendly and positive
- c. He uses me to implement his policies
- d. He does not appreciate my ability and potential
- e. He shows interest in my well-being only to the extent that he feels he must.

	CO	XO	DH	DO	DC	MC
a. Businesslike	**	58	35	28	43	17
b. Friendly	100	33	55	35	35	75
c. Uses me	**	08	10	09	07	08
d. Not appreciated	**	**	**	13	05	**
e. Only as must	**	**	**	15	10	**

QUESTION 28 RESULTS

29. Which of the following best describes the tone of your relationship with the Executive Officer? (If none applies, please choose the answer which is the least inaccurate.)

- a. Businesslike based on mutual respect
- b. Friendly and positive
- c. He uses me to implement his policies
- d. He does not appreciate my ability and potential
- e. He shows interest in my well-being only to the extent that

	CO	XO	DH	DO	DC	MC
a. Businesslike	25	50	50	33	37	09
b. Friendly	75	**	35	48	35	73
c. Uses me	**	**	10	10	13	09
d. Not appreciated	**	**	05	06	04	09
e. Only as must	**	50	**	04	13	**

QUESTION 29 RESULTS

30. Which of the following best describes the dominant motivation which persuaded you to join the Navy?

- a. I saw an opportunity to obtain training and education which otherwise would not have been available to me.
- b. I saw an opportunity to travel and be "on my own".
- c. I wanted to serve my country
- d. I saw an opportunity to become a leader with significant responsibility at an early age.
- e. I saw an opportunity to earn a reasonable income with

	CO	XO	DH	DO	DC	MC
a. Training/Educat.	20	09	30	27	27	31
b. Travel/On own	**	**	05	06	13	31
c. Serve Country	**	18	10	14	28	15
d. Lead Early Age	60	46	35	31	17	08
e. Income/Security	20	27	20	22	13	15

QUESTION 30 RESULTS

31. To what extent do you feel that the word received in the CPO
mess is more accurate than the word received via the chain
of command?

- a. To a very great extent
- b. To a great extent
- c. To some extent
- d. To a little extent
- e. To a very little extent

a.	Vy Great Extent	CO	XO	DH	DO	DC	MC
b.	To Great Extent	**	**	**	07	30	39
c.	Somewhat	**	**	05	21	32	23
d.	To Small Extent	20	55	25	44	28	23
e.	Vy Small Extent	**	27	40	23	03	08
		80	18	30	05	07	08

QUESTION 31 RESULTS

32. To what extent have you been given the opportunity to learn and demonstrate management and leadership commensurate with your ability?

- a. To a very great extent
- b. To a great extent
- c. To some extent
- d. To a little extent
- e. To a very little extent

	CO	XO	DH	DO	DC	MC
a. Vy Great Extent	83	83	60	30	38	62
b. To Great Extent	17	17	30	35	38	15
c. Somewhat	**	**	10	25	16	24
d. To Small Extent	**	**	**	04	07	**
e. Vy Small Extent	**	**	**	07	02	**

QUESTION 32 RESULTS

33. To what extent is the management/leadership aspect of your job more important to you than the warfare/technical aspect?

- a. To a very great extent
- b. To a great extent
- c. To some extent
- d. To a little extent
- e. To a very little extent

	CO	XO	DH	DO	DC	MC
a. Vy Great Extent	17	18	10	19	21	46
b. To Great Extent	33	36	75	33	33	46
c. Somewhat	33	36	10	28	44	08
d. To Small Extent	17	09	**	14	**	**
e. Vy Small Extent	**	**	05	05	02	**

QUESTION 33 RESULTS

34. To what extent does your job performance reflect your maximum capability?

- a. To a very great extent
- b. To a great extent
- c. To some extent
- d. To a little extent
- e. To a very little extent

	CO	XO	DH	DO	DC	MC
a. Vy Great Extent	33	17	05	12	13	31
b. To Great Extent	33	67	55	35	49	46
c. Somewhat	33	17	40	30	30	15
d. To Small Extent	**	**	**	14	07	08
e. Vy Small Extent	**	**	**	08	02	**

QUESTION 34 RESULTS

35. To what extent are your special achievements or extra efforts recognized by the CO?

- a. To a very great extent
- b. To a great extent
- c. To some extent
- d. To a little extent
- e. To a very little extent

	CO	XO	DH	DO	DC	MC
a. Vy Great Extent	50	33	25	07	10	23
b. To Great Extent	50	25	20	27	28	46
c. Somewhat	**	25	35	32	33	15
d. To Small Extent	**	17	20	14	18	15
e. Vy Small Extent	**	**	**	20	12	**

QUESTION 35 RESULTS

36. To what extent have you been given the authority and responsibility commensurate with your billet?

- a. To a very great extent
- b. To a great extent
- c. To some extent
- d. To a little extent
- e. To a very little extent

	CO	XO	DH	DO	DC	MC
a. Vy Great Extent	83	67	50	18	18	39
b. To Great Extent	**	33	30	42	36	15
c. Somewhat	17	**	10	28	28	46
d. To Small Extent	**	**	10	05	13	**
e. Vy Small Extent	**	**	**	07	05	**

QUESTION 36 RESULTS

37. To what extent are you confident that the CO would act on a worthwhile suggestion by you?

- a. To a very great extent
- b. To a great extent
- c. To some extent
- d. To a little extent
- e. To a very little extent

	CO	XO	DH	DO	DC	MC
a. Vy Great Extent	33	50	45	25	21	46
b. To Great Extent	67	50	35	32	34	39
c. Somewhat	**	**	10	25	33	08
d. To Small Extent	**	**	10	09	07	**
e. Vy Small Extent	**	**	**	11	05	08

QUESTION 37 RESULTS

38. To what extent do you feel that the CO has an accurate understanding of your motivations?

- a. To a very great extent
- b. To a great extent
- c. To some extent
- d. To a little extent
- e. To a very little extent

	CO	XO	DH	DO	DC	MC
a. Vy Great Extent	67	42	30	07	15	23
b. To Great Extent	33	42	20	29	21	46
c. Somewhat	**	17	45	30	41	23
d. To Small Extent	**	**	**	14	13	**
e. Vy Small Extent	**	**	05	20	10	08

QUESTION 38 RESULTS

39. To what extent do you feel that the CO has a genuine concern for your welfare?

- a. To a very great extent
- b. To a great extent
- c. To some extent
- d. To a little extent
- e. To a very little extent

	CO	XO	DH	DO	DC	MC
a. Vy Great Extent	33	50	50	19	21	54
b. To Great Extent	67	33	30	26	26	31
c. Somewhat	**	17	10	28	33	08
d. To Small Extent	**	**	10	14	13	08
e. Vy Small Extent	**	**	**	12	07	**

QUESTION 39 RESULTS

40. To what extent do you feel that privileges in the Navy are granted appropriately?

- a. To a very great extent
- b. To a great extent
- c. To some extent
- d. To a little extent
- e. To a very little extent

	CO	XO	DH	DO	DC	MC
a. Vy Great Extent	40	42	15	07	10	08
b. To Great Extent	40	42	30	23	28	46
c. Somewhat	**	17	35	42	43	39
d. To Small Extent	20	**	10	26	13	**
e. Vy Small Extent	**	**	10	02	05	08

QUESTION 40 RESULTS

41. To what extent do you agree with the practice of granting special privileges to personnel junior in rank to persons not granted these privileges (i.e. Sailor of the Quarter/CPO/MCFO reserved parking places at the Navy Exchange or pier parking lots, exemption from the watchbill, etc...)?

- a. Strongly agree with practice
- b. Agree with practice
- c. No opinion
- d. Disagree with practice
- e. Strongly disagree with practice

	CO	XO	DH	DO	DC	MC
a. Strongly agree	50	42	15	32	41	67
b. Agree with	33	33	40	44	39	17
c. No opinion	**	**	10	07	12	08
d. Disagree with	17	25	20	16	03	08
e. Strongly Disagree	**	**	15	02	05	**

QUESTION 41 RESULTS

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